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# The Way Forward: Prioritising and Tackling Constraints

The study set out to answer two questions:

1. First, have we properly understood the constraints small states face and their underlying causes?
2. Second, are the assumptions that drive existing capacity building and other efforts to support small states correct and if not, how should they be revised?

The previous chapters have reported on what existing research tells us about the constraints faced by small states, and how officials and negotiators from small states perceive those constraints and have experienced them in a number of case studies. In this final chapter, we report on how officials and negotiators perceive solutions.

Our findings suggest that the factors that would most enable small states to increase their impact on negotiations vary substantially between countries. However, some patterns emerge. Representatives of small states are very clear on the need to improve the quality of human resources dedicated to trade, to increase the engagement of their political leaders in trade negotiations and to strengthen negotiating strategy. When asked what deeper changes would need to happen for these improvements to occur, emphasis was placed on increasing the priority that governments give to trade, enhancing links between development plans and trade, and strengthening the ability of stakeholder groups, particularly the private sector, to engage in trade policy.

Interestingly, relatively little emphasis was placed on institutional reform *per se*, suggesting that creating the right political incentives is key. Our findings suggest that when the executive is heavily engaged in trade policy and makes demands on trade officials, then greater resources are likely to be allocated to trade policy, and the quality of trade policy and negotiating strategy is likely to be higher, improving the chances of small states having influence in an international context. The executive in turn appears to dedicate greater time to trade when the private sector and other stakeholders make clear demands for it to do so.

A further theme that emerges from the survey, interviews and case studies is that donor initiatives are performing poorly. While they appear to correctly identify many of the proximate constraints that small states face in negotiations, they are less effective at identifying solutions that address underlying causes. Moreover, care has to be taken to minimise bias in the assistance provided by international donors on trade policy. Trade negotiations are a particularly sensitive area, as many donors sit on the opposite side of the negotiating table to small states.


This chapter ends by making some recommendations to small states and to the inter-

national donor community about initiatives that could strengthen the performance of small states in international trade negotiations.

### What factors matter most?

In our survey we asked small state negotiators to rank the factors that ‘most increase the ability of small states to have an impact in trade negotiations’.<sup>150</sup> The results suggest that the factors that are considered most important vary widely across small states. This variation is reflected in the horizontal trend of the ‘overall ranking’ line, which reflects the weighted average of each factor (Figure 8).

**Figure 8. Factors most increasing small states’ ability to influence trade negotiations**



However, some factors are more likely to be ranked first or second in their ability to increase the impact of small states in the negotiating room. ‘Quantity and quality of human resources’ and ‘political leadership’ were most often ranked top priority. In the comments, four respondents noted that the quality of human resources is more important than quantity. These results echo the message emanating from interviews with negotiators on the importance of building an effective negotiating team, and the findings of the case studies, which underscore the crucial role that political leadership plays. ‘Effective negotiating strategy’ was most often ranked as the second highest priority, highlighting the strongly felt need among negotiators for small states to become more proactive around the negotiating table.


These results show similarities and differences with the prevailing consensus in the donor literature, which tends to prioritise human resources, government institutions, quality of available information, and consultation with the private sector and civil society.

Our results suggest that while human resources constraints are indeed a priority, the sources of constraint that are often under-emphasised are weak political leadership and poor negotiating strategies, which were highlighted in the Geneva focus group discussion.

### What could most help individual countries?

To identify the underlying causes and probe ideas for long-term solutions, the penultimate question of the survey asked respondents: ‘What changes would enable your country to tackle the constraints it faces in trade negotiations?’.<sup>151</sup> The results are interesting (Figure 9). ‘Greater priority given to trade by government’ was clearly ranked above other choices, followed by ‘stronger links between development plans and trade’ and ‘private sector priorities driving negotiating objectives’. Although human resource weaknesses were identified elsewhere in the survey as a major constraint, civil service reform was given a low ranking by respondents, suggesting that attention to administrative reform is perhaps less urgent or effective than attention to getting the politics right, i.e. addressing the low priority given to trade within government and improving the strength of domestic institutions. This could be achieved both by improving policy coherence and institutional co-ordination on the links between trade and development, and by strengthening input from private sector organisations. Interestingly, ‘increased donor assistance on trade’ was ranked last. This may suggest that many current donor assistance projects are simply not perceived as useful in tackling the most serious constraints facing small states in trade negotiations.

**Figure 9. Domestic changes that best enable countries to tackle constraints**



Small state trade negotiators clearly believe that trade needs to be taken more seriously by government if they are going to have greater influence in international negotiations. While this may be the case, many also noted in interviews and discussion that there is a need to place trade in a wider development context. While influencing international trade agreements can play an important role in the realisation of a country's development strategy, small states face a suite of competing demands and policy issues deserving of attention (education, health, infrastructure, agriculture, legal reform, etc.), and many of these are considered to be a more critical focus for educated talent and government resources than trade policy. Given the scarcity of resources, it may be prudent for many small states to focus on influencing those international trade negotiations and those specific aspects of trade rules that are likely to yield the most gains. This in turn speaks to the need for clarity on the specific role that trade should play in each country's development strategy and putting in place a robust negotiating strategy to achieve these aims.

Closer scrutiny of the data according to where respondents work reveals significant variation as to the changes they feel would have the most impact (Table 7). Perhaps unsurprisingly, government officials place greatest emphasis on the level of priority given to trade by government. The private sector wishes to see its priorities driving trade negotiations to a greater extent. Civil society representatives place greatest emphasis on strengthening links between development plans and trade. While all give a low ranking to increasing donor assistance, government officials are slightly more favourably disposed to such assistance than the private sector and civil society representatives, perhaps reflecting the fact that they are often the primary beneficiaries.

**Table 7. Domestic change most enabling countries to tackle constraints – variations between respondents: average ranking on scale of 5 (most important) to 1 (least important)**

Where respondent works (number of respondents)	Greater priority given to trade by government	Stronger links between development plans and trade	Private sector priorities driving negotiating objectives	Better government understanding of the needs of small economic actors	Civil service reform	Increased donor assistance on trade
Government official (62)	4	3	3	2	2	2
Private sector (11)	3	2	4	2	1	1
Civil society (6)	2	5	2	4	2	1

At the end of the survey, respondents were asked an open-ended question: 'If you could effect any reform in your country to dramatically improve performance in trade negotiations, what would it be?'. In total, 56 respondents gave answers, with most making more than one suggestion.

Improving the capacity to build an effective negotiating team was clearly the most important to respondents (43 of 56 responses aimed at this). Nearly all mentioned human resources, with 14 specifically identifying the need for greater training of existing staff on the details of negotiations, 11 prioritising the recruitment of additional staff with the right skill sets (with one specifically mentioning legal expertise) and seven identifying the need to address retention problems and high turnover levels, chiefly by improving remuneration and reducing the number of appointments made for political reasons. Improvements in policy co-ordination in government were also high on the list (identified by 14 people), including the need for a more collaborative approach between ministries (9); the need to consolidate trade negotiations into a single lead ministry (3); and the need for clearer negotiating mandates for officials (2). Information and analysis were also mentioned, with nine responses noting the need to have better information, including on the economic realities of small states.

During interviews, the answers of negotiators and ambassadors echoed the findings of the survey, with more than two-thirds (25 of 36) of those asked what would most assist small states citing at least one factor related to building an effective negotiating team. As in the survey, the emphasis was overwhelmingly on the need for excellent human resources. In addition, seven negotiators noted the need for improved co-ordination between government agencies and three emphasised the need for a permanent presence in Geneva.

The need for better harnessing of the inputs of the private sector and civil society was emphasised by half the respondents to our survey (23 of 56). They highlighted measures such as the need for greater collaboration with the private sector and/or civil society (12); the need for private sector representatives on negotiating teams (2); the strengthening of private sector representative bodies (4); an overhaul of the political system to increase democratic participation (2); a reduction of donor influence over trade policy and positions in negotiations (1); and economic reforms to reduce vulnerability to trade policy changes and improve supply-side competitiveness (5). This latter factor was also emphasised by interviewees (particularly officials based in capitals), who highlighted the need to address underlying weaknesses in the economy; they argued that unless supply-side constraints are overcome, small states will be unable to make use of any benefits they gain in the negotiating room (12).

Strategies to better leverage limited bargaining power were mentioned by only five respondents, who highlighted the need to consolidate coalitions (3); to develop alternative proposals to those proposed by powerful countries (1); and to better understand the politics of negotiations (1).

A very strongly voiced view in both the survey and interviews was that small states need more clearly to identify their trade needs and strengthen their trade and development policy (11 survey respondents). The interviewees spoke of the need for 'clearly articulated national interests' and 'knowing what you want' in the negotiating room (this was strongly emphasised by 14 of the 36 respondents). Many interviewees attributed the absence of clear direction in trade policy to weaknesses in the human resource

base, which make it hard to analyse the economic and development needs of their countries and relate these to negotiations. Closely linked to this point, eight of the 36 negotiators raised the need for a clearer negotiating strategy. These tended to be ambassadors, who are naturally more preoccupied with the wider politics of negotiations.

The case studies provide further insights into key constraints, as well as mechanisms for tackling them. The factor that stands out clearly from the case studies is the importance of political leadership, which is in turn often galvanised by high levels of pressure from interest groups and a high level of demand for performance in trade negotiations.

In Benin, where resources are few and government institutions very weak, there was substantial pressure from farmers to address the crisis in the cotton sector and for strong leadership from key individuals. In Papua New Guinea, strong lobbying from the tuna sector drove the country's position in EPA trade negotiations. In Mauritius, a very strong private sector lobby with long-term interests in the development of the country has led the government to give sustained high priority to negotiations. In Barbados, there has been a combination of significant government leadership and some lobbying from private sector groups. In the latter two cases, the demand for performance in trade negotiations has been sustained over time, particularly in Mauritius, spurring the creation of a very strong negotiating team and efficient government institutions.

Whether private sector pressures have always been in the broad 'national' interest is debatable, as the case studies show significant inequalities in terms of the groups that have influence over trade policy. Nonetheless, they suggest that where governments have taken a relatively high level of initiative and influenced trade negotiations, they have been propelled by strong interest groups.

The case study of Ghana reinforces the survey finding regarding the tentative usefulness of many donor initiatives to build trade negotiating capacity. Although Ghana has been the recipient of many donor projects on trade negotiations, these have not been successful at delivering long-term improvements or enduring change (Box 22). The case study suggests that donor initiatives have tackled symptoms, not causes. An element that has been conspicuously absent in Ghana is sustained domestic demand for improved outcomes on trade negotiations. Political leadership on trade has been poor. Even where specific ministers have initiated significant changes, these have never been championed by the highest levels of government. These findings suggest not only the need to reconsider how to deliver more effective donor assistance, but also how this can be done in ways that minimise bias and undue donor influence on trade policy formulation.

## **Box 22 Tackling symptoms, not causes? Ghana**

Ghana has benefited from numerous assistance projects in the area of trade negotiations, yet its performance in negotiations remains weak and few projects appear to have had a lasting impact.

In the area of government institutions, initiatives have included numerous trainings of officials in trade policy, including by the ITC and the WTO. Financial support has been provided to boost participation in trade negotiations. Several long-term technical advisers have been provided to the Ministry of Trade under a series of initiatives by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the ODI to improve technical analysis and preparation for negotiations. An overhaul of the information and statistical databases, funded largely by USAID, aimed to improve the information base. Many donors have funded impact studies, including European Commission financing of EPA assessments. The Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programme, a joint initiative of the ITC, UNCTAD and the WTO, has also provided support for improved inter-ministerial co-ordination.

In terms of the wider political economy, a multi-donor project supported the formulation of a trade policy and implementation strategy over a three-year period, with a relatively high level of consultation. The policy and strategy were discussed and approved by the Ghanaian Cabinet. Trade has also been reflected to a greater extent in Ghana's poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP). In addition, donor support has been provided to strengthen private sector organisations, particularly those oriented to export promotion, to improve their input on negotiations. Similarly, many international NGOs have funded local CSOs to strengthen advocacy on trade.

While several of these initiatives were commended for improving trade policy formulation and negotiation in the short term, there has been little sustained improvement in trade negotiation capacity. Many of the pivotal activities established by donor initiatives have not been sustained, as it was hoped that allocation of financial and human resources for trade policy processes would come from the national budget or through other donor support. Government support for such activities has been on a downward trend in the past five years at a crucial time during preparations for the EPAs.

Moreover, some donor initiatives were heavily criticised for having distorted the process of domestic trade policy-making and enabling donor governments and their agencies to exert undue influence on trade policy. Of particular concern is the propriety of the UK government's financial support for 'embedding' long-term consultants in the Ghanaian Trade Ministry, when the UK government is simultaneously sitting on the other side of the negotiating table in EPA and WTO negotiations.

Source: Interviews for Ghana case study, August 2008 (see Annex 4).

## Recommendations

The challenge for small states is to identify the underlying constraints which, if tackled, could enable sustained improvement in negotiations. As many of the constraints are inter-related, this is a complex task. However, the findings outlined in this study provide some clear recommendations:

- **Political leadership:** A theme underlying many of the findings of this research is the importance of having a high level of leadership from the executive on trade. Such leadership galvanises the government machinery into action. When the executive is highly engaged, demands are made on trade officials and institutions to perform, and greater human and financial resources are allocated to trade. Political leadership is particularly important for small states, as it helps offset the power asymmetries they inevitably face in trade negotiations, especially when negotiating with countries that are also donors. As leaders are most likely to effectively engage in trade policy when demands are made on them from their constituents, this speaks to the need to strengthen representative organisations from the private sector and civil society.
- **Human resources and institutional design:** Small states need to develop a strong negotiating team with a high level of competence and experience, to attract and retain technical experts with excellent diplomatic skills and a tenacious attitude, and to provide them with a working environment in which they can excel. The study highlights the fact that for this to happen there is a need to move away from an exclusive focus on the technical training of individuals and to address the disruptive institutional incentives that many negotiators face. This would improve performance and retention rates, as well as accountability to national trade ministers, parliaments and policy goals.
- **Clearly identified trade interests:** Few small states clearly and consistently identify their interests in trade negotiations. Where states have done so, this often reflects the presence of strong private sector interest groups. This poses a dilemma for the poorer small states with weak private sectors, as even if government is open to consultation it receives little input. One option is for states to strengthen private sector organisations to better articulate trade policy positions. However, this needs to be complemented by government taking the initiative in determining policy direction. This in turn requires strong human resources and policy analysis that is rooted in local economic realities and is relevant to ongoing negotiations. As this study shows, the information and analysis provided by donor organisations is often inappropriate. Local academic and policy institutes could be greatly strengthened to provide autonomous and relevant policy advice.
- **Specific negotiating strategy:** Once human resource constraints are tackled and negotiating interests clearly defined, small states need to be more proactive in negotiations and to invest in negotiating strategy. While technical skills are clearly extremely



important, the effectiveness of efforts by technical officials from small states to influence the detail of texts is higher when complemented by efforts to also increase their bargaining power. In particular, the study highlights an array of tactics that can be used to increase political weight and leverage, including investing in alliances with like-minded countries, forming coalitions and engaging negotiating partners at a high political level prior to and, as appropriate, during technical negotiations.

By acting in concert, small states are able to pool technical capacity, mitigating the challenges posed by human resource constraints. Their individual negotiating strength is augmented by increasing their numbers and market size through collective action. The regional coalitions that have been effective in the negotiating room are those with a long history of integration, a high level of trust and a high level of communication between the members. A number of small states have an explicit strategy of leading groups and coalitions to exert influence in negotiations.

Further, engaging powerful states at the most senior political level prior to negotiations is important, as is seeking allies within powerful states, as this helps to break down their negotiating positions and makes compromise more likely. A close relationship between the head of state and the trade officials within small states can also be of significant importance for strengthening their negotiating position when subjected to threat.

To augment negotiating power, this study also emphasises the importance of political strategies that make strategic use of principles, norms and ideas to reframe issues to their advantage both inside and outside the negotiating room.

This report did not set out to evaluate the initiatives of international donors in supporting small states. However, the research does provide some insights that suggest that donor initiatives are not fulfilling their aims. Representatives of small states note that initiatives are tackling symptoms rather than underlying causes, for instance by providing research and consultancy assistance rather than helping small states improve their human resource base. Furthermore, there are clear concerns of bias in the provision of assistance, particularly when donors and small states sit on opposite sides of the table in trade negotiations. In addition, in some countries donors are considered to be the actors with greatest influence over trade policy, crowding out the interests of local constituencies. The study highlights a number of areas where external actors might refocus their efforts:

- **Government institutions:** Small states continue to face severe constraints in fielding a strong team of negotiators. External donors are well placed to provide financial and technical support to aid governments in reforming their institutions to improve working conditions and organisational efficacy. However, the report also highlights the way in which direct support to trade ministries is inevitably compromising. For this reason, such support could be channelled through independent third parties that have no direct stake in the outcome of trade negotiations, such as the Commonwealth Secretariat, UNCTAD and regional development banks. To be effective, support needs to be long term and predictable, and provide governments with a high degree of

autonomy to hire and retain experts of their choosing on a long-term basis. This would avoid the creation of disruptive incentives and strengthen accountability.

- **Private sector:** Given the weakness of private sector organisations in many small states, donors could play a greater role in strengthening their capacity to identify their trade interests and lobby government. However, the study also highlights the need to avoid biases in such assistance that risk strengthening some economic sectors above others.
- **Academic institutions, NGOs and think-tanks:** In many small states there is a paucity of independent scrutiny and advice to policy-makers, and a perception that donors unduly influence trade policy (particularly where private sector organisations are weak). To strengthen the autonomy and independence of trade policy-making, donors could play an important role in strengthening academic and research institutions, as well as NGOs, so small states have a stronger information base from which to negotiate.
- **International coalitions and organisations:** The study highlights the importance to small states of coalition building and information sharing. A series of intergovernmental collaborations, initiatives and organisations, particularly at the regional level, have been established to facilitate these linkages. However, as they often depend on funds from developing countries, they are often resource constrained. External donors could assist by strengthening such organisations through long-term financial assistance. Once again, to ensure that accountability is primarily to national governments, it is important that such support is channelled through independent third parties or otherwise removed from undue political meddling.

A final critical reflection concerns the need for developed country donors to take seriously the need to reduce the perception of threat under which many small state negotiators operate, whether this is related to aid or trade. In many cases, bilateral development donors present their assistance to the smallest and poorest states as a matter of co-operation for development, whereas their counterparts in trade ministries engage in commercial, reciprocal bargaining processes with the same countries that demonstrate far less sensitivity to the unequal power of the negotiating parties.

While power asymmetries inevitably exist, bilateral donors should take measures within their own governments to insulate small states from threats related to the withdrawal of trade preferences or other potential sanctions, and to ensure that trade negotiations are sensitive to the broader development priorities of small states. To reduce the threat of trade sanctions, donor countries could ensure that all trade preferences they grant are long term and bound, with an effective enforcement mechanism, and do not have policy conditionalities attached. Similarly, to reduce concerns about bias in assistance they should channel their support for trade capacity building initiatives through independent third parties and ensure it is disbursed in ways that provide small states with a high level of autonomy and discretion as to its use. Such initiatives would help address the fear among small state negotiators that such factors will be used to unduly influence their positions during trade negotiations.

## Notes

- 1 For statistics on the Cook Islands, see <http://www.cook-islands.gov.ck/cook-islands.php>, and on Jamaica, see <http://jamaica.embassyhomepage.com/>. Last accessed 14 July 2009.
- 2 For statistics on population and GDP per capita see World Bank, 'Defining a Small Economy', available at <http://web.worldbank.org>. Last accessed 14 July 2009.
- 3 See Annex 2 Survey, Question 2.
- 4 See Annex 2 Survey, Questions 3 and 4.
- 5 Kotschwar (1999), p. 135; Peretz *et al.* (2001).
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 151.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 150.
- 8 Bora, Grynberg and Razzaque (2005).
- 9 See, for instance, Limao and Venables (1999).
- 10 Winters and Martins (2004), p. 2.
- 11 Page and Kleen (2005), p. 61.
- 12 Winters and Martins (2004), p. 37; World Bank (2006).
- 13 Kotschwar (1999), p. 145.
- 14 Tussie and Lengyel (2002), p. 487.
- 15 Mattoo and Subramanian (2004), p. 393.
- 16 Solignac-Lecomte (2002), pp. 21–22; Jawarwa and Kwa (2003), pp. 150–158.
- 17 Freund (2003); Elgström (2000).
- 18 Solignac-Lecomte (2001).
- 19 See, for example, Krueger (1999).
- 20 Davis (2003), p. 20.
- 21 Tussie and Lengyel (2002), p. 491; Steinberg (2002).
- 22 Grynberg, Dugal and Razzaque (2006).
- 23 Bown and Hoekman (2005).
- 24 A list of WTO dispute settlement cases is available from the WTO website, [www.wto.org](http://www.wto.org)
- 25 ICTSD (2008).
- 26 Nottage (2008).
- 27 As noted above, as the focus of this study is limited to trade negotiations specifically, the challenges of dispute settlement are noted here as part of the structural context of international trade negotiations for small states, but are not explored in greater detail in the remainder of the study, although dispute settlement matters did occasionally arise in some interviews.
- 28 Eagleton-Pierce (2008).
- 29 Page (2003) reviews these perspectives.
- 30 See, for instance Odell (2006); Page (2003; 2005).
- 31 Page (2005).
- 32 OECD and WTO (2009).
- 33 Blackhurst, Lyakurwa and Oyejide (2000); Ohiorhenuan (2005); Page (2003); Deere (2008).
- 34 Blackhurst, Lyakurwa and Oyejide (2000), p. 500.
- 35 Page (ed.) (2006), p. 28.
- 36 For more information, see [http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/191502/159353/what\\_is\\_hub\\_spokes/](http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/191502/159353/what_is_hub_spokes/)
- 37 Tandon (2004).
- 38 Deere-Birkbeck (2009).
- 39 See analysis of the 'EU Trade Related Technical Assistance Available to ACP States', available at <http://www.delnga.ec.europa.eu/trade/MappingTRTA.pdf>
- 40 Solignac-Lecomte (2001); Deere (2005). See also Bilal, Laporte and Szepesi (2007).
- 41 Deere (2005).
- 42 Tandon (2004).
- 43 Solignac-Lecomte (2001).
- 44 Interview E4.
- 45 See Question 12, Annex 2. Note that these figures need to be interpreted with due caution as the sample is unevenly distributed across countries.
- 46 Based on combined Commonwealth Secretariat and World Bank lists (Annex 1). A list of non-resident delegations is available at [www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_E/devvel\\_e/genwk\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/devvel_e/genwk_e.htm)

- 47 Nordstrom (2007).
- 48 See Question 12, Annex 2.
- 49 A list of missions is available at <http://www.un.org/members/missions.shtml>
- 50 The 'rating average' is a weighted average of the results, with 1st assigned weight of 5, 2nd a weight of 4 and so on.
- 51 See Question 16, Annex 2.
- 52 Interview B8.
- 53 Interview B19.
- 54 Interview G3.
- 55 Mauritius Case Study.
- 56 See Question 15, Annex 2.
- 57 See Question 13, Annex 2.
- 58 See Question 14, Annex 2. Although 70 people answered the question, the remaining seven selected 'other' and noted that they did not know.
- 59 Interview B16.
- 60 Interview B5.
- 61 Barbados Case Study.
- 62 Question 19, Annex 2.
- 63 Interview B7.
- 64 Interview B3.
- 65 Interview B11.
- 66 Question 17, Annex 2.
- 67 The observation by eight respondents that their governments do not produce trade flow data needs to be interpreted with caution, as the majority of small states regularly report trade data.
- 68 Question 18, Annex 2.
- 69 Interview B14.
- 70 Interview B16.
- 71 Ghosh (2008).
- 72 Question 22, Annex 2.
- 73 Question 21, Annex 2.
- 74 Interview B15.
- 75 Interview B16.
- 76 Interview G5.
- 77 Ghosh (2008); Halle and Wolfe (2007); Gallagher, Low and Stoler (eds) (2005).
- 78 Question 23, Annex 2.
- 79 See, for instance, Rudaheranwa and Barungi Atingi-Ego (2005); Halle and Wolfe (2007).
- 80 Bown and Hoekman (2005); Ohiorhenuan (2005).
- 81 Bown and Hoekman (2005), p. 871.
- 82 Stoler (2005); Halle and Wolfe (2007).
- 83 See, for instance, Krugman (ed.) (1986).
- 84 Brock and McGee (2004).
- 85 Ibid., p. 50.
- 86 Bilal *et al.* (2007).
- 87 See, for instance, Page (2002).
- 88 Interview B4.
- 89 Interview C4.
- 90 Question 24, Annex 2.
- 91 ILO (2008).
- 92 Interview C12.
- 93 Interview B5.
- 94 Interview B7.
- 95 Question 22, Annex 2.
- 96 Odell (2006).
- 97 Narlikar (2004).
- 98 Patel (2007).
- 99 Ibid.

- 100 Narlikar (2004), p. 167.
- 101 Bilal, Laporte and Szepesi (2007).
- 102 Odell (2006), p. 87.
- 103 Ibid., p. 109.
- 104 Laurent (2007).
- 105 Odell and Ortiz Mena (2004), p. 9.
- 106 The examples noted here are for illustrative purposes only. As there was not an equal spread of respondents from small states across the various regions, we have not attempted to make a comparison of which specific regional groupings possible members considered to be their most important grouping or to see which regional grouping had the greatest number of eligible respondents who considered it the most important grouping for their negotiations. Note that not all respondents provided their country, so it is difficult to ascertain how a particular respondent's country impacted on its choice of which kind of group mattered most or to differentiate how many respondents were eligible to choose interest-based groups versus regional or characteristic-based groups.
- 107 Question 9, Annex 2.
- 108 Question 10, Annex 2.
- 109 Interview 8.
- 110 Interview E6.
- 111 Interview E2.
- 112 Mauritius Case Study.
- 113 Barbados Case Study.
- 114 Barbados Case Study.
- 115 Question 25, Annex 2. Note that this question is rated on a scale of 1 (Never) to 4 (Often). Figures reported in the graph and Annex are based on a subset of respondents directly involved in trade negotiation.
- 116 Odell (2000); Narlikar (2004).
- 117 Odell (2001), p. 1. Odell elaborates that a 'distributive strategy' often involves tactics such as 'opening high, misrepresenting one's true priorities and minimum needs, taking others' issues hostage, and worsening their alternative to agreement'.
- 118 Ibid.
- 119 Ibid.
- 120 Question 26, Annex 2. Note that this question is rated on a scale of 1 (Never) to 4 (Often). Figures reported in the graph and Annex are based on a subset of respondents directly involved in trade negotiation.
- 121 Interview B7.
- 122 Barbados Case Study.
- 123 Barbados Case Study.
- 124 Interview G3.
- 125 Interview B19.
- 126 Interview G5.
- 127 Interview B7.
- 128 Interview 21.
- 129 Barbados Case Study.
- 130 Barbados Case Study.
- 131 Interview 14.
- 132 Interview 11.
- 133 Interview C12.
- 134 Interview E4.
- 135 Interview E7.
- 136 Interview C12.
- 137 Interview G6.
- 138 Question 27, Annex 2. Note that this question is rated on a scale of 1 (Never) to 4 (Often). Figures reported in the graph and Annex are based on a subset of respondents directly involved in trade negotiation.
- 139 Question 6, Annex 2.
- 140 Question 7, Annex 2.
- 141 Question 7, Annex 2 (second table).
- 142 Interview C12.
- 143 Interview 2.

- 144 Interview B4.  
145 Benin Case Study.  
146 Benin Case Study.  
147 Interview B17.  
148 Interview B8.  
149 Interview C3.  
150 Question 8, Annex 2. This was a means of orienting respondents to constraints that can be tackled, rather than structural constraints which arise from their smallness *per se*. Respondents were given options that were identified in the donor literature (quality and quantity of human resources, efficacy of government institutions, quality of available information, and consultation with the private sector and civil society). These were supplemented with other factors that are identified in the scholarly literature and were identified in an initial focus group discussion with small state negotiators in Geneva (political leadership, negotiating strategy, building coalitions).  
151 Question 28, Annex 2.