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A Commonwealth Initiative to Support UN Reform

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Summary

This paper places UN reform in the context of reform of the international system and has been prepared on the basis of representative consultation. The core argument can be summarised in four sentences:

- First, Commonwealth countries need the UN to meet and solve global challenges and shared problems, and to take advantage of opportunities for change.
- Second, the UN is not performing as well as it could.
- Third, reform is slow, for understandable reasons.
- Fourth, the Commonwealth can play a unique role in forging consensus about the shape and pace of change.

There is a long list of issues on the table – ranging from big opportunities to make progress on the millennium development goals (MDGs) to the management of problems like climate change or the threat of disease. Various UN panels and international commissions have made contributions, as have Commonwealth leaders.

Not all collective action problems are for the UN to solve. Sometimes non-governmental bodies or smaller groups of countries can make adequate progress. There is a special role for the UN, however, where action is required that involves engagement by nation states, universality, political legitimacy, formal accountability or the interlinking of political, economic, social and normative frameworks.

Against this background, the UN does well in providing the infrastructure of internationalism. In addition, it is a very large provider of financial assistance and humanitarian aid, and a key forum for conflict resolution and resource for peace-keeping.

But at the same time no-one doubts the fragility of the system, especially when it is faced with new challenges.

Proposals for UN reform have a long history. There is already quite a substantial reform agenda on the table and progress has been made, but very slowly and in a sometimes fraught political atmosphere.

Now the UN Secretary-General has identified the development arena as important for reform. The MDG *Call to Action* made in September 2008 offered one opportunity, as did the Financing for Development meeting which took place on 29 November–2

December in Doha. It is likely, however, that early 2009 will be taken up with debate, before the pace of change accelerates.

There are many barriers to progress, including lack of trust among UN member countries; an overloaded and excessively interconnected reform agenda; and a lack of authority exercised by the Secretary-General, especially with respect to the specialised agencies.

Accelerating progress to reform through overcoming the barriers is the challenge for all in the international community.

The role of the Commonwealth

System reform – especially when it involves the UN – demands careful attention to the ‘how’ as well as the ‘why’ and the ‘what’. Past efforts have rarely lacked good ideas, but have often foundered when it comes to building a consensus for change.

The unique role of the Commonwealth – with its shared values, global reach, and mix of large and small states – lies in its potential to forge a new consensus on the need for change and how to deliver it.

A first step would be to create a Commonwealth approach to accelerating the existing reform processes. Heads of Government should agree principles and priorities for the role of the UN in the future. In the light of these, the Commonwealth Secretariat could be mandated to produce a short- to medium-term action programme, which is manageable given the timetables of current UN reform processes, working within current constraints, but also, importantly, finding ways to lift the constraints.

There is also a longer-term reform agenda and, particularly, a specific issue around the emerging aid architecture. Although aid is not increasing as rapidly as was promised at the G8 summit at Gleneagles, increasing volumes are likely to flow through the UN system. There is a need to consider how additional aid money can be used more effectively and as a catalyst for movement on reform issues.

To tackle these issues, the Secretariat could be asked to draw up a timeline and implementation plan, stretching over at least an 18-month period in order to give time for consensus building, within the Commonwealth and more widely. An ‘advocacy roadmap’ for the Commonwealth would be especially useful.

Commonwealth engagement

The Secretariat’s initial thoughts for areas in which proposals could be developed include:

- Strengthening the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to ensure that it has a role in promoting greater coherence and co-ordination in addressing global developmental challenges;
- Promoting reform of the international aid architecture, with an effective role for the new UN Development Cooperation Forum (UNDCF) and more secure and multi-year funding for key UN agencies and programmes;
- Greater focus on fragile and vulnerable economies across all agencies and programmes;

- A unified UN funding mechanism for the MDGs;
- Building international capacity to respond rapidly to economic and social crises, and mechanisms for co-ordination;
- Developing stronger relationships with regional organisations and giving high priority to building their capacity to respond to emerging challenges;
- Strengthened and concerted Commonwealth advocacy at meetings such as the UN MDG summit, the high level forum on aid effectiveness which took place in Accra in September 2008 and the Doha Financing for Development meeting.

Core questions

Practically, there are ten questions that need to be answered about the reform process:

1. What transnational issues are of most concern?
2. Which of these requires international collective action?
3. Which is most suitable for UN, rather than alternative, management?
4. How should one judge the capacity of the UN to deliver the desired changes?
5. What changes would ensure that the UN does a more effective job?
6. Are these changes already on the UN reform agenda?
7. Will these changes be delivered by ongoing UN reform processes?
8. If not, what has to happen to accelerate ongoing reform?
9. What additional measures should be on the agenda?
10. What has to happen to deliver these additional measures?

Transnational issues for the twenty-first century

Reform is about tackling problems and managing risks, but also about taking advantage of opportunities. In 2008, the international agenda was dominated by peace and security, the rising price of food and the threat of climate change – but also by the opportunity to make significant progress towards the millennium development goals.

In 2002, Jean-François Rischard wrote a book entitled *High Noon: 20 Global Problems, 20 Years to Solve Them*. He distinguished between: (a) issues involving the global commons, such as global warming and water deficits; (b) issues whose size and urgency requires a global commitment, such as the fight against poverty and conflict prevention; and (c) issues needing a global regulatory approach, such as the global financial architecture and rules for e-commerce. The full list is reproduced in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1. Twenty global challenges

Sharing our planet: issues involving the global commons	Sharing our humanity: issues whose size and urgency require a global commitment	Sharing our rulebook: issues that need a global regulatory approach
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Global warming • Biodiversity and ecosystem losses • Fisheries depletion • Deforestation • Water deficits • Maritime safety and pollution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Massive step-up in the fight against poverty • Peace-keeping, conflict prevention • Education for all • Global infectious diseases • The digital divide • Natural disaster prevention and mitigation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Re-inventing taxation • Biotechnology rules • Global financial architecture • Illegal drugs • Trade, investment and competition rules • Intellectual property rights • E-commerce rules • International labour and migration rules

Source: J-F Rischard, 2002


Others have been in similar terrain. For example, the international Task Force on Global Public Goods, led by Ernesto Zedillo and Tidjane Thiam, which reported in 2006, identified six priorities:

- Preventing the emergence and spread of infectious diseases
- Tackling climate change
- Enhancing international financial stability
- Strengthening the international trading system
- Achieving peace and security
- Deterring international terrorism

The World Economic Forum has taken a global risk management approach, examining economic, geopolitical, environmental, social and technological risks, ranging from extreme weather events to issues like the failure of the communications technology that connects the world. Risks are assessed according to their likelihood and potential magnitude (see Figure 2.2).

With the movement made possible by the ending of the cold war, the UN itself has taken many initiatives to deal with global problems and has been the beneficiary of reports dealing with its role. These include the 1995 Commission on Global Governance, chaired by a former Commonwealth Secretary-General; *An Agenda for Democratization*, a report submitted by the UN Secretary-General in 1996; the Brahimi Report on peace-keeping operations published in 2001; the report of the 2004 World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization; and the deliberations of the High-level Panels on Threats, Challenges and Change, and on System-wide Coherence,

Figure 2.2. The 18 core global risks: likelihood and severity by number of deaths



which reported at the end of Kofi Annan’s tenure as Secretary-General. There was also the UN Secretary-General’s own report, launched in 2005, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All*.

The first of the High-level Panels produced a report entitled *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, published in December 2004. It dealt specifically with: (a) what it called ‘comprehensive collective security’; (b) poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; (c) conflict between and within states; (d) nuclear, radiological and biological weapons; (e) terrorism; and (f) transnational organised crime.

The report of the second panel was called *Delivering as One* and was published in November 2006. It focused particularly on issues related to development, humanitarian assistance and the environment, arguing that:

Ours is the era of globalization, of global change unprecedented in its speed, scope and scale. As the world becomes ever more interdependent, sharp social and economic inequalities persist. Some of the poorest countries and communities remain isolated from economic integration and the benefits of globalization, and are disproportionately vulnerable to crisis and social upheaval. There is greater awareness of the acceleration of environmental degradation and climate change, and its effects on agricultural productivity and food security. More conflicts are within states than between them, and the risk of terrorism and infectious disease illustrate that security threats travel across borders.

Poverty, environmental degradation and lagging development heighten vulnerability and instability to the detriment of all. Now, more than ever, dealing with inequality – by achieving the Millennium Development Goals and wider development objectives – is central to economic stability and global security. In the face of unacceptable poverty we have a clear moral imperative to act when we have the knowledge, ability and resources to do so.

Delivering as One, 2006, paras 2–3

There have been other significant contributions from outside the UN, for example, Childers and Urquhart (1994); the independent working group report, *The United Nations in its Second Half-Century* (1995); and the South Centre report (1997).

The UN Secretariat faces many challenges. The MDG ‘Call for Action’ summit took place on 25 September 2008 and in the same month there was also a review of the global counter-terrorism strategy. Major initiatives are currently underway on disarmament, energy, global health and agriculture. Climate change is a major theme for 2009.

Finally, several Commonwealth leaders have taken initiatives or made speeches that identify global issues. For example, in his speech at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, USA, on 18 April 2008, the UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, talked of:

... new global challenges that our growing interdependence brings: their scale, their diversity and the speed with which they have emerged:

- the globalisation of the economy;
- the threat of climate change;
- the long struggle against international terrorism;
- the need to protect millions from violence and conflict; and
- to face up to the international consequences of poverty and inequality.

Challenges that all point in one direction – to the urgent necessity for global co-operation. For none of them – from economy to environment – can be solved without us finding new ways of working more closely together.

Gordon Brown made specific proposals, for example, for a UN crisis recovery fund and a role for the World Bank on the environment. He summarised his proposals as follows:

So a new World Bank; a new International Monetary Fund; a reformed and renewed United Nations mandated and resourced that is greater than the sum of its parts; strong regional organisations from the European Union to the African Union able to bring to a troubled world the humanitarian aid, peacekeeping and the support for stability and reconstruction that has been absent for too long – all built around a new global society founded on revitalised international rules and institutions, and grounded in the great values we share in common.

Underlying many of these proposals and interventions is a pragmatic commitment to multilateralism, in which better co-ordination and collective action are achieved by some pooling of decision-making. Pragmatic multilateralism recognises the costs of engagement, but also the (sometimes hard-won) benefits. Agreeing a commitment to pragmatic multilateralism would provide a valuable principle in adjudicating some current issues, such as the future aid architecture.

However, agreeing a specific list of priorities is not an easy issue. As the report of the UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change observed:

We must not underestimate the difficulty of reaching a new consensus about the meaning and responsibilities of collective security. Many will regard one or more of the threats we identify as not really being a threat to international peace and security. Some believe that HIV/AIDS is a horrible disease, but not a security threat. Or that terrorism is a threat to some States, but not all. Or that civil wars in Africa are humanitarian tragedy, but surely not a problem for international security. Or that poverty is a problem of development, not security.

Differences of power, wealth and geography do determine what we perceive as the gravest threats to our survival and well-being. Differences of focus lead us to dismiss what others perceive as the gravest of all threats to their survival. Inequitable responses to threats further fuel division. Many people believe that what passes for collective security today is simply a system for protecting the rich and powerful. Such perceptions pose a fundamental challenge to building collective security today. Stated baldly, without mutual recognition of threats there can be no collective security. Self-help will rule, mistrust will predominate and co-operation for long-term mutual gain will elude us.

pp. 11–12

The Commonwealth may have a particular perspective on some of these issues, given its shared values, its global reach and its mix of large and small states. For example, there may be a specific interest in some regions in fragile states. However, UN reform needs a comprehensive and global perspective.

International collective action

It is not axiomatic that global problems require global solutions, nor that highly structured global institutions are needed. For example, the actions of one country can create global externalities which measures in that country can tackle. Large-scale heroin production in Afghanistan may be an example of this; it can perhaps be tackled by the government of that country, with international help. Similarly, some global problems can be dealt with by multiple independent or very lightly co-ordinated interventions. For example, the Lagos Plan of Action, adopted by the OAU in 1980, identified slow agricultural growth as a regional problem in Africa, constraining food security and poverty reduction, and called on each country, independently, to aim for a 4 per cent growth rate.

Furthermore, collective action can be of different kinds. Rischard (2002) usefully distinguishes between actions affecting the global commons, those needing a global regulatory approach and those that simply need large-scale commitments.

In more detail, it is possible to think of truly representative international collective action as a seven-step ladder of progressively greater complexity:

1. Information collection and dissemination
2. Technical co-ordination and standard setting
3. Jointly undertaken research on cross-cutting issues
4. Consensus building, advocacy and target setting
5. The preparation and negotiation of international treaties or conventions
6. Co-ordination of action among agencies, both national and international
7. Direct action (developmental, humanitarian and peace-keeping)

Figure 2.3 gives some examples of collective action under these headings. Note that some fit within a UN framework and others do not. For example, the internet is regulated independently; the G8 has taken the lead on some aspects of international development; and the Paris Declaration is a product of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC), not of the UN. There is an increasing tendency to set up multi-stakeholder groups or new initiatives involving the private sector: for example, the World Economic Forum has established the Business Alliance against Chronic Hunger and the Global Education Initiative.

Figure 2.3. Examples of collective action

Information collection and dissemination	IMF International Financial Statistics FAO Crop Outlook International Energy Agency
Technical co-ordination and standard setting	FAO Codex Alimentarius Internet Architecture Board Basle Agreement on Bank Regulation
Jointly undertaken research on cross-cutting issues	Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
Consensus building, advocacy, and target setting	World Commission on Dams Millennium Declaration and millennium development goals
The preparation and negotiation of international treaties or conventions	Law of the Sea Montreal Protocol on the Ozone Layer Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty WTO
Co-ordination of action among national and international agencies and the private sector	Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
Direct action (development, humanitarian and peace-keeping)	UN Development Programme (UNDP) World Food Programme (WFP) Peace-keeping forces

It becomes relevant, then, to ask what kind of collective action is necessary to solve different transnational problems and how it should be organised. Is it appropriate to seek single, unified organisations or to allow, or even encourage, a network approach? There are views on both sides. For example, some argue for a highly integrated UN, which would match the World Bank: others celebrate diversity and differentiation. In the last analysis, form should follow function – effectiveness is the test of global governance arrangements.

In this connection, it is worth making the point that collective action of any kind can be difficult and time-consuming, as has been illustrated by the painful progress towards a Doha trade round and a post-Kyoto climate change deal. In an article in *Global Governance Journal* in 2005, I observed from a review of the literature on collective action that:

... co-operation requires a combination of an enabling social environment and a rational exercise of ruthless self-interest: a mutually reinforcing mix of culture and calculus. But the great problem with multilateral co-operation is that that specific mix is often missing.

In the search for solutions, I was led to an eight-step programme for more successful collective action:

- Keep the core group small;
- Embed trust-building measures from the beginning;
- Use the same core group for as many issues as possible;
- Encourage 'network closure' by making it awkward or embarrassing for those who refuse to co-operate (e.g. by mobilising public opinion);
- Choose the right issues;
- Think about positive incentives;
- Increase the costs of defection;
- Establish institutions to manage interactions.

There are other factors. For example, a sense of crisis can drive change more quickly.

Experience of UN reform shows that careful preparation and dialogue contribute greatly to consensus building. The preparation of the Financing for Development meeting held at Monterrey, Mexico in 2002 illustrates the potential of careful diplomacy.

Priorities for the UN

The logic of the discussion is to identify the highest priority transnational issues, specify the type of collective action required and then decide which of these should be taken to the UN and which can be dealt with outside, for example in regional groupings such as the European Union and African Union or subregional groupings; in special purpose vehicles such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); in OECD/DAC; or in public-private initiatives such as the bodies which manage the internet.

What principles might guide the decision? As an intergovernmental organisation, the UN may be the most suitable forum for collective action which requires or benefits from:

- Engagement by nation states
- Universality
- Political legitimacy
- Formal accountability
- Interlinking of political, economic, social and normative frameworks

An assessment of UN capacity

It is important to recognise the good the UN does, as in the various manifestations of collective action summarised above. In many ways, the infrastructure of internationalism

ticks away successfully and more or less out of sight. The Law of the Sea, the Montreal Protocol, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights are all accepted building blocks of a functioning global society. In addition, the UN is a very large provider of financial assistance and humanitarian aid, providing approximately \$15 billion a year, or about 15 per cent of the total. It is an important forum for conflict resolution and a key resource for peace-keeping: there are more than 100,000 soldiers wearing blue berets in the world today.

At the same time, no-one doubts the fragility of the system, especially now that it is faced with new challenges. Kofi Annan observed in 2003:

... the system is not working as it should ... We need to take a hard look at our institutions themselves ... They may need radical reform.¹

The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change made the following observation on the weaknesses in the UN system:

Throughout the work of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, we have looked for institutional weaknesses in current responses to threats. The following stand as the most urgently in need of remedy:

- The General Assembly has lost vitality and often fails to focus effectively on the most compelling issues of the day.
- The Security Council will need to be more proactive in the future. The Security Council needs greater credibility, legitimacy and representation to do all that we demand of it.
- There is a major institutional gap in addressing countries under stress and countries emerging from conflict. Such countries often suffer from attention, policy guidance and resource deficits.
- The Security Council has not made the most of the potential advantages of working with regional and sub regional organisations.
- There must be new institutional arrangements to address the economic and social threats to international security.
- The Commission on Human Rights suffers from a legitimacy deficit that casts doubts on the overall reputation of the United Nations.
- There is a need for a more professional and better organised Secretariat that is much more capable of concerted action.

p. 14

The High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence stated:

There are many reasons why the UN has become fragmented and weak: from a lack of buy-in and mixed messages from member states between capitals and representa-

tives in various bodies, to a proliferation of agencies, mandates and offices, creating duplication and dulling the focus on outcomes, with moribund entities never discontinued. Even when mandates intersect UN entities tend to operate alone with little synergy and co-ordination between them. The UN system now encompasses 17 specialised agencies and related organisations, 14 funds and programmes, 17 departments and offices of the UN Secretariat, 5 regional commissions, 5 research and training institutes and a plethora of regional and country level structures. The loss of cohesion prevents the UN from being more than the sum of its parts.

- At the country level, operational incoherence between UN funds, programmes and agencies is most evident. More than one-third of UN country teams include 10 or more UN agencies on the ground at any one time. Several teams include 20 or more. This has led to incoherent programme interventions and excessive administrative costs. It also burdens the capacity of developing countries to deal with multiple agencies. Of 60 countries analysed by the Panel, 17 country teams had an annual budget of less than US\$2 million per agency. Nor does the normative and analytical expertise of non-resident agencies sufficiently support UN country team efforts. Without authoritative leadership by the UN Resident Co-ordinator, and system-wide ownership of the Resident Co-ordinator system, incentives for better co-ordination remain limited.
- Signs of fragmentation are also apparent at the regional level. Regional offices of different UN agencies are scattered in different locations, and definitions of regions can differ from one agency to another. In some regions strong regional and sub-regional institutions either exist or are rapidly evolving while others have strayed from their original mandates. This calls for a review of the UN's regional roles and settings, including the Regional Commissions, to address regional needs, avoid duplication and overlapping functions and seek a coherent regional institutional landscape.
- More synergy is also needed at the global level. In some sectors, such as water and energy, more than 20 UN agencies are active and compete for limited resources without a clear collaborative framework. More than 30 UN agencies and programmes have a stake in environmental management. On specific issues, such as internally displaced people, several agencies have a legitimate interest, but none has a clear lead. Merging UN agencies does not always lead to better outcomes. But we believe there must be a significant streamlining of UN agencies so that the UN can 'deliver as one', reduce duplication and significantly reduce the burdens it currently places on recipient and donor governments, without diluting the performance and expertise of individual organisations.
- Inadequate and unpredictable funding of the system also contributes to fragmentation, undermining the multilateral character of the UN. The exponential growth of extra-budgetary (non-core) versus core resources has encouraged supply-driven rather than demand-driven approaches to assistance, undermining the principle of country ownership. Lack of donor co-ordination and competition for non-core resources among UN agencies squander significant time and effort on fundraising,

undermining the UN's ability to make long-term strategic decisions that would deliver more effective results. Nor does the UN have a common system for its overall development funding or for measuring results transparently and systematically.
pp. 9–10

The funding issue is worth particular mention. A recent comprehensive review of the financing for operational activities of the UN shows that the total spend is now about US\$15 billion (2005 data), with the UNDP, WFP and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) accounting for 61 per cent of the total. The trend away from core funding continues, however, with over half of all funding now being non-core, for example through trust funds. For three large agencies for which long-term data are available, the UNDP, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UNICEF, the share of core funding has fallen over 15 years from 80 per cent to under 30 per cent.

Agendas for change

There is a long history of reform proposals for the UN, including qualified majority voting in the General Assembly, the creation of an economic security council, more open appointment procedures and changes to the funding basis of UN agencies, funds and programmes.

The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change failed to reach agreement on a way forward for Security Council reform, but produced 101 recommendations, covering all aspects of their remit. A summary of these is given in Annex 2.1. Recommendations 70–101 deal with 'A more effective UN for the twenty-first century', covering changes to ECOSOC, the Human Rights Commission and the regional organisations, as well as proposing a peace-building commission.

The 'One UN' panel also made a large number of recommendations, including:

- The establishment of 'One UN' at country level, with one leader, one programme, one budget and, where appropriate, one office;
- The establishment of a UN sustainable development board to oversee the 'One UN' country programmes;
- The appointment of a UN development co-ordinator with responsibility for the performance and accountability of UN development activities;
- The appointment of an independent task force to further eliminate duplication within the UN system and consolidate UN entities where necessary;
- The establishment of an MDG funding mechanism to provide multi-year funding for the 'One UN' country programmes;
- Multi-year core funding for UN organisations committed to and demonstrating reform;
- A common UN evaluation system, to be established by 2008;

- A set of measures to enhance the UN's leading role in humanitarian disasters and emergencies;
- An independent assessment of international environmental governance;
- Upgrading of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP);
- The establishment of a dynamic UN entity focused on gender equality and women's empowerment; and
- New formal agreements on the respective roles and relations of the UN, the World Bank and the IMF.

On 'One UN' at country level, the Panel specifically recommended the setting up of five pilots by 2007 and, subject to satisfactory review, 20 programmes by 2009, 40 by 2010 and universal roll-out by 2012 to all other appropriate programmes.

It remains an open question whether this is an adequate reform agenda. For example, recent contributions have emphasised the need to rethink the relationship between development and humanitarian programmes, especially in fragile states and post-conflict situations, and also to give greater consideration to the relationship between the headquarters and field activities of UN agencies. There are also specific reform initiatives of great importance to the system, like the repositioning of the World Food Programme to reduce its reliance on food aid or the implementation of an independent external evaluation of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

For Commonwealth Heads of Government, it is also necessary to undertake a more detailed review of UN capacity to deliver the specific priorities they agree.

Progress in achieving change

It is probably fair to say that progress on the current UN reform agenda is uneven.

An important set of measures was agreed at the UN world summit in 2005, notably the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and the reform of the human rights apparatus. The summit was also significant for agreeing the 'responsibility to protect', originally proposed in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty established by the Government of Canada (and much discussed in the context of the cyclone crisis in Burma).

The setting up of the PBC was especially important. There have been two recent reviews of its operations, a study by Action Aid, CAFOD and CARE International (2007) and a study commissioned by the Government of Denmark (2008). The second report is summarised in Annex 2.2. It is broadly favourable to the work of the Commission, concluding:

We found positive signs and concrete examples to indicate that the PBC is beginning to find its niche and demonstrate its value-added, particularly . . . creating linkages between political/security and financial/development actors, and maintaining long-

term attention. In both Burundi and Sierra Leone, the existence of a body that connected the UN missions, a broad grouping of member states including key donors and troop contributors, the international financial institutions, and the national authorities, provided a tool through which to resolve critical challenges and help keep both countries on the path to sustainable peace. Performance on co-ordination issues has been more mixed, and on early financing, is as yet untested ... An assessment of cautious optimism is widely shared among PBC members, alongside a recognition of the need to streamline still cumbersome procedures and resolve or surmount tensions about the relationship between the PBC and the principal UN organs. Members are also cognisant of a need to work to reverse early negative impressions formed in capitals and among UN departments and agencies during the procedure-heavy first phase of the PBC's life.

International Centre on International Cooperation and International Peace
Institute, 2008, p. 2²

There has been no similar independent review of the 'One UN' programme, but the main area of progress has been in setting up initial pilots at country level. There are eight of these, in Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay and Vietnam. The pilots have been viewed as generally successful, with administrative savings being channelled back into development programming. It is important that the pilot countries themselves have been enthusiastic. Other countries, for example Malawi, are keen to join.

The President of the UN General Assembly has appointed the ambassadors of Ireland and Tanzania to oversee progress. They have focused especially on three issues, governance, funding and gender, while emphasising that their informal consultations are not intended as a substitute for an evaluation of the pilots, which is due in 2009. Meanwhile, some valuable new areas of work have emerged, for example relating to the involvement of agency headquarters.

The consultations have revealed important positions, and sometimes differences, which lie at the heart of any discussion of UN reform. For example, there is repeated emphasis on:

- The importance of ownership by developing countries and the need to avoid conditionality;
- The issue of funding gaps, and especially the need for core funding of UN agencies and programmes, preferably on an assessment basis;
- The need to respect diversity of country situations and avoid 'one size fits all' solutions;
- The value of a results-based framework; and
- Caution on some of the proposals of the High-level Panel, especially on a sustainable development board and integrated funding.

Other aspects of 'One UN' include the creation of the Chief Executives Board (replac-

ing the Administrative Committee on Coordination) and a number of initiatives on information about funding, evaluation, harmonisation of business practices, etc. The creation in September 2007 of an MDG steering group bringing together the UN, the World Bank and the IMF is also important.

The last triennial comprehensive policy review of the operational activities of the UN development system was submitted to ECOSOC in May 2007. It focused particularly on the predictability of funding, the coherence and capacity of the UN development system, and evaluation. The summary states:

... the bedrock principles of operational activities of the UN system derive from their universal, voluntary and grant nature as well as their neutrality and multilateralism. Operational activities are therefore strongly anchored in the normative mandates and roles established by the UN system.³

In addition to these initiatives, the UN has established a development co-operation forum, as an expression of an enhanced role for ECOSOC. This was launched in July 2007 and met formally on 30 June–1 July 2008.

Independently, there is continued progress on reform of the humanitarian system, including the gradual bedding down of the Central Emergency Response Fund, the introduction of the cluster system and work on the ‘good humanitarian donorship’ agenda.

In terms of the future, the UN Secretary-General has identified the development arena as important for reform. It is likely that there will be step by step progress towards a better overview of the country pilots. There is no specific timetable, but it is expected that the pace of change will accelerate in 2009.

Accelerating reform

The pace at which change takes place is really the nub of the issue. There is already quite a substantial reform agenda on the table, but progress is slow. Anecdotally, reasons for this include:

- A lack of trust between the G77 and the rich countries and fear by the G77 that attempts to introduce new doctrine (for example, responsibility to protect) or work towards greater coherence threaten their sovereignty;
- Too many issues being linked together so that, for example, progress on ‘One UN’ is linked to the outcome of the Doha Round;
- Paradoxically, in some cases the opposite problem arises, for example the G77’s nervousness about human rights issues being brought up outside the remit of the Human Rights Commission;
- A ‘chicken and egg’ problem, where donor countries are unwilling to tackle core financing issues until efficiency improves, but efficiency remains seriously constrained by poor funding arrangements;

- The lack of authority of the Secretary-General, in the sense that specialised agencies are governed by their own boards or councils;
- Lack of coherence by UN members in actions taken at the UN in New York and on the boards and councils of specialised agencies;
- In some cases (e.g. Security Council reform), difficulty in adjudicating between the claims of different developing countries.


Can Commonwealth Heads of Government help to overcome these barriers?

What else should be on the agenda?

Another way of asking this is to question whether Commonwealth priorities can be moved up the ‘to do’ list. In particular, are Commonwealth Heads of Government satisfied with the relatively small-scale, piecemeal and slow changes currently underway? Do they think it is possible to take a large-scale initiative which lifts the current agenda to a new level?

One example is to consider the role of the UN in the emerging aid architecture and to do so with a long-term perspective. Aid is not increasing as fast as promised at the G8 meeting at Gleneagles, and it looks rather unlikely that it will do so, although pressure will be maintained through the MDG Call to Action. Figure 2.4 shows the latest OECD/DAC figures, and commitments are summarised in Annex 2.3.

Figure 2.4. DAC members’ net ODA, 1990–2006, and DAC Secretariat simulations of net ODA to 2007 and 2010



Nevertheless, if aid does reach US\$130 billion, and if the UN retains its current share of about 15 per cent, then a three-year budget would be equivalent to about \$60 billion and a five-year budget to \$100 billion. A commitment to greater multilateralism in the aid system would raise the volume substantially. It should be recorded that ODI surveys on aid architecture demonstrate strong attachment to the UN in developing countries, with the UN identified as a preferred partner for additional disbursements.

Would a conversation about how to programme additional aid money more effectively be a catalyst for movement on reform issues?

Implementation issues and next steps

The phenomenon of rapid globalisation is making the need for coherent understanding and action even more pressing and responses to this within the Commonwealth would be of wider interest. The International Labour Organisation Commission report, *A Fair Globalisation*, rightly asserts that 'globalisation is making multilateralism both indispensable and inevitable'.

The first step is for Commonwealth Heads of Government to agree their own principles and priorities for the role of the UN in the future.

The second step is to agree a short- to medium-term action programme, which is manageable given the timetables of current UN reform processes, working within current constraints, but also, importantly, finding ways to lift the constraints. What are the quick wins or 'down-payment' initiatives? What is more difficult?

The third step is to agree a timeline and implementation plan, stretching over at least 18 months, in order to give time for consensus building within the Commonwealth and more widely. An 'advocacy road-map' for the Commonwealth would be especially useful, including activities which make use of fora like the finance ministers meeting and which link to wider proposals, such as a possible Bretton Woods II.

The final step is to make arrangements to manage this process.

In consultations relating to this project, the Commonwealth Secretary-General has emphasised the compatibility between the global objectives that both the UN and the Commonwealth should be striving to achieve and the need for enlightened multilateralism to overcome diverse and contested perspectives to deliver a shared understanding. The conviction is gaining ground that responses to today's global challenges can only be achieved by collective debate and action in order to achieve satisfactory and sustainable outcomes. We are striving towards a higher order in organising human society which is democratic in spirit, equitable in its outcomes, embracing all its constituents and yielding a collective benefit. This just order must accommodate the interests and needs of its smallest and most vulnerable members. Concerted and prudent engagement in attempts to work towards shared goals in numerous and diverse fields is therefore no longer an option but an urgent necessity.

The Commonwealth has demonstrated this unity of belief, purpose and action to an impressive degree in a variety of fields, often overlapping with the agenda of the UN.

The wealth of experience accumulated by the Commonwealth and its success could allow it to operate as a valued and constructive counsellor and partner in the deliberations and activities of the appropriate UN agencies. The Commonwealth works in a wide range of fields, such as governance and the rule of law, and in more specific areas such as gender, youth, finance, environment, trade education and health. It is the view of the Commonwealth Secretary-General that a comprehensive evaluation should be undertaken to establish the points of commonality and areas for institutional interaction between the Commonwealth and the UN relevant agencies, in order to develop a more formalised approach. This will also serve the desirable purpose of highlighting to a wider audience the accomplishments of the Commonwealth in areas being pursued by the UN. The Secretary-General believes these measure could include annual communications to the UN Secretary-General and the heads of a range of UN agencies and programmes. This will positively supplement the shared objective of the international community of moving towards system-wide coherence.

Both developed and developing countries agree that as the one intergovernmental organisation with nearly universal representation from the spectrum of nation states, the UN is indispensable and should be strengthened. Increasing efficiency, transparency and effectiveness are also goals that are shared by the UN and the Commonwealth. Both agree that improved processes will make the UN stronger. However, member states from the South believe that coherence should not become a rationalisation for placing less emphasis on development. Furthermore, it should not undermine the established role of the UN General Assembly and ECOSOC in providing coherence to the work of the Bretton Woods institutions; lead to the weakening of regional economic commissions and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); facilitate the move away from assessed to voluntary funding; or lead to the creation of a skewed agenda that underplays the priorities of the developing world. In a post-cold war globalising world, opportunities for reaching collective understanding about a shared direction have increased and prospects for making headway on enlightened multilateralism may in fact be brightening. The North–South divide may today be more bridgeable, given the prospects for convergence. This will require the development of shared political will, agreement on ends and means, and the generation of resources to address the collective challenge of, for example, achieving the MDGs and underwriting the global environment programme. In this creation of shared ground, the Commonwealth is a cross-cutting template of the global community as a whole, and has proven strength and a key role to play. It should seek ways to exercise this positive influence.

Annex 2.1

Summary of Recommendations of the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*

Note: The number in parentheses after each summarised recommendation refers to the paragraph in the main report that contains the complete text of the recommendation.

PART TWO

Collective security and the challenge of prevention

Poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation

1. All States must recommit themselves to the goals of eradicating poverty, achieving sustained economic growth and promoting sustainable development. (59)
2. The many donor countries which currently fall short of the United Nations 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) for official development assistance (ODA) should establish a timetable for reaching it. (60)
3. World Trade Organization (WTO) members should strive to conclude the Doha development round of multilateral trade negotiations at the latest in 2006. (62)
4. Lender governments and the international financial institutions should provide highly indebted poor countries with greater debt relief, longer rescheduling and improved access to global markets. (63)
5. Although international resources devoted to meeting the challenge of HIV/AIDS have increased from about US\$250 million in 1996 to about \$2.8 billion in 2002, more than \$10 billion annually is needed to stem the pandemic. (64)
6. Leaders of countries affected by HIV/AIDS need to mobilize resources, commit funds and engage civil society and the private sector in disease-control efforts. (65)
7. The Security Council, working closely with UNAIDS, should host a second special session on HIV/AIDS as a threat to international peace and security, to explore the future effects of HIV/AIDS on States and societies, generate research on the problem and identify critical steps towards a long-term strategy for diminishing the threat. (67)
8. International donors, in partnership with national authorities and local civil society organizations, should undertake a major new global initiative to rebuild local and national public health systems throughout the developing world. (68)
9. Members of the World Health Assembly should provide greater resources to the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network to increase its capacity to cope with potential disease outbreaks. (69)
10. States should provide incentives for the further development of renewable energy

*UN General Assembly, 2 December 2004, High-level Panel report on Threats, Challenges and Change, www.un.org/secureworld

sources and begin to phase out environmentally harmful subsidies, especially for fossil fuel use and development. (71)

11. We urge Member States to reflect on the gap between the promise of the Kyoto Protocol and its performance, re-engage on the problem of global warming and begin new negotiations to produce a new long-term strategy for reducing global warming beyond the period covered by the Protocol (2012). (72)

Conflict between and within States

12. The Security Council should stand ready to use the authority it has under the Rome Statute to refer cases of suspected war crimes and crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court. (90)
13. The United Nations should work with national authorities, international financial institutions, civil society organizations and the private sector to develop norms governing the management of natural resources for countries emerging from or at risk of conflict. (92)
14. The United Nations should build on the experience of regional organizations in developing frameworks for minority rights and the protection of democratically elected Governments from unconstitutional overthrow. (94)
15. Member States should expedite and conclude negotiations on legally binding agreements on the marking and tracing, as well as the brokering and transfer, of small arms and light weapons. (96)
16. All Member States should report completely and accurately on all elements of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and the Secretary-General should be asked to report annually to the General Assembly and Security Council on any inadequacies in the reporting. (97)
17. A training and briefing facility should be established for new or potential special representatives of the Secretary-General and other United Nations mediators. (101)
18. The Department of Political Affairs should be given additional resources and should be restructured to provide more consistent and professional mediation support. (102)
19. While the details of such a restructuring should be left to the Secretary-General, it should take into account the need for the United Nations to have:
 - (a) A field-oriented, dedicated mediation support capacity, comprised of a small team of professionals with relevant direct experience and expertise, available to all United Nations mediators;
 - (b) Competence on thematic issues that recur in peace negotiations, such as the sequencing of implementation steps, the design of monitoring arrangements, the sequencing of transitional arrangements and the design of national reconciliation mechanisms;
 - (c) Greater interaction with national mediators, regional organizations and non-governmental organizations involved in conflict resolution;

- (d) Greater consultation with and involvement in peace processes of important voices from civil society, especially those of women, who are often neglected during negotiations. (103)
- 20. National leaders and parties to conflict should make constructive use of the option of preventive deployment of peacekeepers. (104)

Nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons

- 21. The nuclear-weapon States must take several steps to restart disarmament:
 - (a) They must honour their commitments under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to move towards disarmament and be ready to undertake specific measures in fulfilment of those commitments;
 - (b) They should reaffirm their previous commitments not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. (120)
- 22. The United States and the Russian Federation, other nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should commit to practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war, including, where appropriate, a progressive schedule for de-alerting their strategic nuclear weapons. (121)
- 23. The Security Council should explicitly pledge to take collective action in response to a nuclear attack or the threat of such attack on a non-nuclear weapon State. (122)
- 24. Negotiations to resolve regional conflicts should include confidence-building measures and steps towards disarmament. (123)
- 25. States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should pledge a commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament, demonstrating their commitment by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and supporting negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty, both of which are open to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. We recommend that peace efforts in the Middle East and South Asia launch nuclear disarmament talks that could lead to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions similar to those established for Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific and South-East Asia. (124)
- 26. All chemical-weapon States should expedite the scheduled destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles by the agreed target date of 2012. (125)
- 27. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should without delay return to negotiations for a credible verification protocol, inviting the active participation of the biotechnology industry. (126)
- 28. The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should recognize the Model Additional Protocol as today's standard for IAEA safeguards, and the Security Council should be prepared to act in cases of serious concern over non-compliance with non-proliferation and safeguards standards. (129)

29. Negotiations should be engaged without delay and carried forward to an early conclusion on an arrangement, based on the existing provisions of Articles III and IX of the IAEA statute, which would enable IAEA to act as a guarantor for the supply of fissile material to civilian nuclear users. (130)
30. While that arrangement is being negotiated, States should, without surrendering the right under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to construct uranium enrichment and reprocessing facilities, voluntarily institute a time-limited moratorium on the construction of any further such facilities, with a commitment to the moratorium matched by a guarantee of the supply of fissile materials by the current suppliers at market rates. (131)
31. All States should be encouraged to join the voluntary Proliferation Security Initiative. (132)
32. A State's notice of withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should prompt immediate verification of its compliance with the Treaty, if necessary mandated by the Security Council. The IAEA Board of Governors should resolve that, in the event of violations, all assistance provided by IAEA should be withdrawn. (134)
33. The proposed timeline for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to convert highly enriched uranium reactors and reduce HEU stockpiles should be halved from 10 to five years. (135)
34. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should negotiate a new bio-security protocol to classify dangerous biological agents and establish binding international standards for the export of such agents. (137)
35. The Conference on Disarmament should move without further delay to negotiate a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty that, on a designated schedule, ends the production of highly enriched uranium for non-weapon as well as weapons purposes. (138)
36. The Directors-General of IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) should be invited by the Security Council to report to it twice-yearly on the status of safeguards and verification processes, as well as on any serious concerns they have which might fall short of an actual breach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Chemical Weapons Convention. (140)
37. The Security Council should consult with the WHO Director-General to establish the necessary procedures for working together in the event of a suspicious or overwhelming outbreak of infectious disease. (144)

Terrorism

38. The United Nations, with the Secretary-General taking a leading role, should promote a comprehensive strategy against terrorism, including:
 - (a) Dissuasion, working to reverse the causes or facilitators of terrorism, including

- through promoting social and political rights, the rule of law and democratic reform; working to end occupations and address major political grievances; combating organized crime; reducing poverty and unemployment; and stopping State collapse;
- (b) Efforts to counter extremism and intolerance, including through education and fostering public debate;
 - (c) Development of better instruments for global counter-terrorism cooperation, all within a legal framework that is respectful of civil liberties and human rights, including in the areas of law enforcement; intelligence-sharing, where possible; denial and interdiction, when required; and financial controls;
 - (d) Building State capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations;
 - (e) Control of dangerous materials and public health defence. (148)
39. Member States that have not yet done so should actively consider signing and ratifying all 12 international conventions against terrorism, and should adopt the eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing issued by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-supported Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering and the measures recommended in its various best practices papers. (150)
 40. The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee should institute a process for reviewing the cases of individuals and institutions claiming to have been wrongly placed or retained on its watch lists. (152)
 41. The Security Council, after consultation with affected States, should extend the authority of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to act as a clearing house for State-to-State provision of military, police and border control assistance for the development of domestic counter-terrorism capacities. (154)
 42. To help Member States comply with their counter-terrorism obligations, the United Nations should establish a capacity-building trust fund under the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate. (155)
 43. The Security Council should devise a schedule of predetermined sanctions for State non-compliance with the Council's counter-terrorism resolutions. (156)
 44. The General Assembly should rapidly complete negotiations on a comprehensive convention on terrorism, incorporating a definition of terrorism with the following elements:
 - (a) Recognition, in the preamble, that State use of force against civilians is regulated by the Geneva Conventions and other instruments, and, if of sufficient scale, constitutes a war crime by the persons concerned or a crime against humanity;
 - (b) Restatement that acts under the 12 preceding anti-terrorism conventions are terrorism, and a declaration that they are a crime under international law; and restatement that terrorism in time of armed conflict is prohibited by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols;
 - (c) Reference to the definitions contained in the 1999 International Convention

for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004);

- (d) Description of terrorism as ‘any action, in addition to actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act’. (163–164)

Transnational organized crime

- 45. Member States that have not signed, ratified or resourced the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three Protocols, and the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption should do so, and all Member States should support the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in its work in this area. (172)
- 46. Member States should establish a central authority to facilitate the exchange of evidence among national judicial authorities, mutual legal assistance among prosecutorial authorities and the implementation of extradition requests. (173)
- 47. A comprehensive international convention on money-laundering that addresses the issues of bank secrecy and the development of financial havens needs to be negotiated, and endorsed by the General Assembly. (174)
- 48. Member States should sign and ratify the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and parties to the Protocol should take all necessary steps to effectively implement it. (175)
- 49. The United Nations should establish a robust capacity-building mechanism for rule-of-law assistance. (177)

The role of sanctions

- 50. The Security Council must ensure that sanctions are effectively implemented and enforced:
 - (a) When the Security Council imposes a sanctions regime – including arms embargoes – it should routinely establish monitoring mechanisms and provide them with the necessary authority and capacity to carry out high-quality, in-depth investigations. Adequate budgetary provisions must be made to implement those mechanisms;
 - (b) Security Council sanctions committees should be mandated to develop improved guidelines and reporting procedures to assist States in sanctions implementation, and to improve procedures for maintaining accurate lists of individuals and entities subject to targeted sanctions;

- (c) The Secretary-General should appoint a senior official with sufficient supporting resources to enable the Secretary-General to supply the Security Council with analysis of the best way to target sanctions and to assist in coordinating their implementation. This official would also assist compliance efforts; identify technical assistance needs and coordinate such assistance; and make recommendations on any adjustments necessary to enhance the effectiveness of sanctions;
 - (d) Donors should devote more resources to strengthening the legal, administrative, and policing and border-control capacity of Member States to implement sanctions. Capacity-building measures should include efforts to improve air-traffic interdiction in zones of conflict;
 - (e) The Security Council should, in instances of verified, chronic violations, impose secondary sanctions against those involved in sanctions-busting;
 - (f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the Security Council, should ensure that an appropriate auditing mechanism is in place to oversee sanctions administration. (180)
51. Sanctions committees should improve procedures for providing humanitarian exemptions and routinely conduct assessments of the humanitarian impact of sanctions. The Security Council should continue to strive to mitigate the humanitarian consequences of sanctions. (181)
 52. Where sanctions involve lists of individuals or entities, sanctions committees should establish procedures to review the cases of those claiming to have been incorrectly placed or retained on such lists. (182)

PART THREE

Collective security and the use of force

Using force: rules and guidelines

53. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations should be neither rewritten nor reinterpreted, either to extend its long-established scope (so as to allow preventive measures to non-imminent threats) or to restrict it (so as to allow its application only to actual attacks). (192)
54. The Security Council is fully empowered under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to address the full range of security threats with which States are concerned. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority but to make the Council work better than it has. (198)
55. The Panel endorses the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. (203)

56. In considering whether to authorize or endorse the use of military force, the Security Council should always address – whatever other considerations it may take into account – at least the following five basic criteria of legitimacy:
- (a) *Seriousness of threat*. Is the threatened harm to State or human security of a kind, and sufficiently clear and serious, to justify *prima facie* the use of military force? In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended?
 - (b) *Proper purpose*. Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to halt or avert the threat in question, whatever other purposes or motives may be involved?
 - (c) *Last resort*. Has every non-military option for meeting the threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that other measures will not succeed?
 - (d) *Proportional means*. Are the scale, duration and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum necessary to meet the threat in question?
 - (e) *Balance of consequences*. Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being successful in meeting the threat in question, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction? (207)
57. The above guidelines for authorizing the use of force should be embodied in declaratory resolutions of the Security Council and General Assembly. (208)

Peace enforcement and peacekeeping capability

58. The developed States should do more to transform their existing force capacities into suitable contingents for peace operations. (216)
59. Member States should strongly support the efforts of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations Secretariat, building on the important work of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see A/55/305-S/2000/809), to improve its use of strategic deployment stockpiles, standby arrangements, trust funds and other mechanisms in order to meet the tighter deadlines necessary for effective deployment. (218)
60. States with advanced military capacities should establish standby high readiness, self-sufficient battalions at up to brigade level that can reinforce United Nations missions, and should place them at the disposal of the United Nations. (219)
61. The Secretary-General should recommend and the Security Council should authorize troop strengths for peacekeeping missions that are sufficient to deter and repel hostile factions. (222)
62. The United Nations should have a small corps of senior police officers and managers (50–100 personnel) who could undertake mission assessments and organize the start-up of police components of peace operations, and the General Assembly should authorize this capacity. (223)

Post-conflict peacebuilding

63. Special representatives of the Secretary-General should have the authority and guidance to work with relevant parties to establish robust donor-coordinating mechanisms, as well as the resources to perform coordination functions effectively, including ensuring that the sequencing of United Nations assessments and activities is consistent with government priorities. (226)
64. The Security Council should mandate and the General Assembly should authorize funding for disarmament and demobilization programmes from assessed budgets for United Nations peacekeeping operations. (227)
65. A standing fund for peacebuilding should be established at the level of at least \$250 million that can be used to finance the recurrent expenditures of a nascent government, as well as critical agency programmes in the areas of rehabilitation and reintegration. (228)

Protecting civilians

66. All combatants must abide by the Geneva Conventions. All Member States should sign, ratify and act on all treaties relating to the protection of civilians, such as the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and all refugee conventions. (233)
67. The Security Council should fully implement resolution 1265 (1999) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict. (237)
68. The Security Council, United Nations agencies and Member States should fully implement resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. (238)
69. Member States should support and fully fund the proposed Directorate of Security and accord high priority to assisting the Secretary-General in implementing a new staff security system in 2005. (239)

PART FOUR

A more effective United Nations for the twenty-first century

The General Assembly

70. Members of the General Assembly should use the opportunity provided by the Millennium Review summit in 2005 to forge a new consensus on broader and more effective collective security. (240)
71. Member States should renew efforts to enable the General Assembly to perform its function as the main deliberative organ of the United Nations. This requires a better conceptualization and shortening of the agenda, which should reflect the contemporary challenges facing the international community. Smaller, more tightly focused committees could help to sharpen and improve resolutions that are brought to the whole Assembly. (242)

72. Following the recommendation of the report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations (see A/58/817), the General Assembly should establish a better mechanism to enable systematic engagement with civil society organizations. (243)

The Security Council

73. Reforms of the Security Council should meet the following principles:
- (a) They should, in honouring Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations, increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, militarily and diplomatically – specifically in terms of contributions to United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to the voluntary activities of the United Nations in the areas of security and development, and diplomatic activities in support of United Nations objectives and mandates. Among developed countries, achieving or making substantial progress towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA should be considered an important criterion of contribution;
 - (b) They should bring into the decision-making process countries more representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world;
 - (c) They should not impair the effectiveness of the Security Council;
 - (d) They should increase the democratic and accountable nature of the body. (249)
74. A decision on the enlargement of the Council, satisfying these criteria, is now a necessity. The presentation of two clearly defined alternatives, of the kind described below as models A and B, should help to clarify – and perhaps bring to resolution – a debate which has made little progress in the last 12 years. (250)
75. Models A and B both involve a distribution of seats as between four major regional areas, which we identify, respectively, as ‘Africa’, ‘Asia and Pacific’, ‘Europe’ and ‘Americas’. We see these descriptions as helpful in making and implementing judgments about the composition of the Security Council, but make no recommendation about changing the composition of the current regional groups for general electoral and other United Nations purposes. Some members of the Panel, in particular our Latin American colleagues, expressed a preference for basing any distribution of seats on the current regional groups. (251)
76. Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas. Model B provides for no new permanent seats, but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas. (252–253)
77. In both models, having regard to Article 23 of the Charter, a method of encouraging Member States to contribute more to international peace and security would be

for the General Assembly, taking into account established practices of regional consultation, to elect Security Council members by giving preference for permanent or longer-term seats to those States that are among the top three financial contributors in their relevant regional area to the regular budget, or the top three voluntary contributors from their regional area, or the top three troop contributors from their regional area to United Nations peacekeeping missions. (254)

78. There should be a review of the composition of the Security Council in 2020, including, in this context, a review of the contribution (as defined in paragraph 249 of the main report) of permanent and non-permanent members from the point of view of the Council's effectiveness in taking collective action to prevent and remove new and old threats to international peace and security. (255)
79. The Panel recommends that under any reform proposal, there should be no expansion of the veto. (256)
80. A system of 'indicative voting' should be introduced, whereby members of the Security Council could call for a public indication of positions on a proposed action. (257)
81. Processes to improve transparency and accountability in the Security Council should be incorporated and formalized in its rules of procedure. (258)

A Peacebuilding Commission

82. The Security Council, acting under Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations and after consultation with the Economic and Social Council, should establish a Peacebuilding Commission. (263)
83. The core functions of the Peacebuilding Commission should be to identify countries that are under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse; to organize, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for transitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over whatever period may be necessary. (264)
84. While the precise composition, procedures and reporting lines of the Peacebuilding Commission will need to be established, they should take account of the following guidelines:
 - (a) The Peacebuilding Commission should be reasonably small;
 - (b) It should meet in different configurations, to consider both general policy issues and country-by-country strategies;
 - (c) It should be chaired for at least one year and perhaps longer by a member approved by the Security Council;
 - (d) In addition to representation from the Security Council, it should include representation from the Economic and Social Council;
 - (e) National representatives of the country under consideration should be invited to attend;

- (f) The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, the President of the World Bank and, when appropriate, heads of regional development banks should be represented at its meetings by appropriate senior officials;
 - (g) Representatives of the principal donor countries and, when appropriate, the principal troop contributors should be invited to participate in its deliberations;
 - (h) Representatives of regional and subregional organizations should be invited to participate in its deliberations when such organizations are actively involved in the country in question. (265)
85. A Peacebuilding Support Office should be established in the Secretariat to give the Peacebuilding Commission appropriate Secretariat support and to ensure that the Secretary-General is able to integrate system-wide peacebuilding policies and strategies, develop best practices and provide cohesive support for field operations. (266)

Regional organizations

86. In relation to regional organizations:
- (a) Authorization from the Security Council should in all cases be sought for regional peace operations;
 - (b) Consultation and cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations should be expanded and could be formalized in an agreement, covering such issues as meetings of the heads of the organizations, more frequent exchange of information and early warning, co-training of civilian and military personnel, and exchange of personnel within peace operations;
 - (c) In the case of African regional and subregional capacities, donor countries should commit to a 10-year process of sustained capacity-building support, within the African Union strategic framework;
 - (d) Regional organizations that have a capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping should place such capacities in the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System;
 - (e) Member States should agree to allow the United Nations to provide equipment support from United Nations-owned sources to regional operations, as needed;
 - (f) The rules for the United Nations peacekeeping budget should be amended to give the United Nations the option on a case-by-case basis to finance regional operations authorized by the Security Council with assessed contributions. (272)

The Economic and Social Council

87. The Economic and Social Council should provide normative and analytical leadership in a time of much debate about the causes of, and interconnections between, the many threats we face. To that end, the Economic and Social Council should establish a Committee on the Social and Economic Aspects of Security Threats. (276)

88. The Economic and Social Council should provide an arena in which States measure their commitments to achieving key development objectives in an open and transparent manner. (277)
89. The Economic and Social Council should provide a regular venue for engaging the development community at the highest level, in effect transforming itself into a 'development cooperation forum'. To that end:
 - (a) A new approach should be adopted within the Economic and Social Council agenda, replacing its current focus on administrative issues and programme coordination with a more focused agenda built around the major themes contained in the Millennium Declaration;
 - (b) A small executive committee, comprising members from each regional group, should be created in order to provide orientation and direction to the work of the Economic and Social Council and its interaction with principal organs, agencies and programmes;
 - (c) The annual meetings between the Economic and Social Council and the Bretton Woods institutions should be used to encourage collective action in support of the Millennium Development Goals and the Monterrey Consensus;
 - (d) The Economic and Social Council, with inputs from its secretariat and the United Nations Development Group, should aim to provide guidance on development cooperation to the governing boards of the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies;
 - (e) The Economic and Social Council should provide strong support to the efforts of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Development Group to strengthen the coherence of United Nations action at the field level and its coordination with the Bretton Woods institutions and bilateral donors. (278)

The Commission on Human Rights

90. Membership of the Commission on Human Rights should be made universal. (285)
91. All members of the Commission on Human Rights should designate prominent and experienced human rights figures as the heads of their delegations. (286)
92. The Commission on Human Rights should be supported in its work by an advisory council or panel. (287)
93. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights should be called upon to prepare an annual report on the situation of human rights worldwide. (288)
94. The Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission should request the High Commissioner for Human Rights to report to them regularly on the implementation of all human rights-related provisions of Security Council resolutions, thus enabling focused, effective monitoring of those provisions. (289)

The Secretariat

95. To assist the Secretary-General, an additional Deputy Secretary-General position should be created, responsible for peace and security. (293)

96. The Secretary-General should be provided with the resources he requires to do his job properly and the authority to manage his staff and other resources as he deems best. To meet the needs identified in the present report, the Panel recommends that:
- (a) Member States recommit themselves to Articles 100 and 101 of the Charter of the United Nations;
 - (b) Member States review the relationship between the General Assembly and the Secretariat with the aim of substantially increasing the flexibility provided to the Secretary-General in the management of his staff, subject always to his accountability to the Assembly;
 - (c) The Secretary-General's reform proposals of 1997 and 2002 related to human resources should now, without further delay, be fully implemented;
 - (d) There should be a one-time review and replacement of personnel, including through early retirement, to ensure that the Secretariat is staffed with the right people to undertake the tasks at hand, including for mediation and peacebuilding support, and for the office of the Deputy Secretary-General for peace and security. Member States should provide funding for this replacement as a cost-effective long-term investment;
 - (e) The Secretary-General should immediately be provided with 60 posts – less than 1 per cent of the total Secretariat capacity – for the purpose of establishing all the increased Secretariat capacity proposed in the present report. (296)

The Charter of the United Nations

97. In addition to any amendment of Article 23 of the Charter of the United Nations required by proposed reform of the Security Council, the Panel suggests the following modest changes to the Charter:
98. Articles 53 and 107 (references to enemy States) are outdated and should be revised. (298)
99. Chapter XIII (The Trusteeship Council) should be deleted. (299)
100. Article 47 (The Military Staff Committee) should be deleted, as should all references to the Committee in Articles 26, 45 and 46. (300)
101. All Member States should rededicate themselves to the purposes and principles of the Charter and to applying them in a purposeful way, matching political will with the necessary resources. Only dedicated leadership within and between States will generate effective collective security for the twenty-first century and forge a future that is both sustainable and secure. (302)

Annex 2.2

The Peacebuilding Commission

Executive Summary

Following the completion of its year as a member of the Peacebuilding Commission, and against the backdrop of Denmark's extensive role along with Tanzania in negotiating the establishment of the PBC, the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the UN commissioned the CIC/IPI Joint Program on Peacebuilding as Statebuilding to undertake a strategic review of the body's performance. The purpose of this document is to take stock and to look forward. The PBC is a young body still finding its feet. We use as a framework for assessment the notion that three years is a credible timespan within which a new inter-governmental body should be fully functional. Thus, this report serves as a stocktaking, assessing progress to date by the PBC and making suggestions about how to continue to enhance its impact. To this end we interviewed senior officials of all PBC member countries, as well as UN and other stakeholders in New York, Burundi, and Sierra Leone.⁴

Rationale for the PBC: Four problems

The Peacebuilding Commission was proposed by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and was endorsed by the Secretary-General's *In Larger Freedom* report. The High-level Panel found that the UN had a vital and irreplaceable role in peacebuilding, with unique legitimacy and comparative advantages that could not be replicated elsewhere. However, it expressed concern that:

1. Although UN Security Council (UNSC) mandated operations had been expanded into peacebuilding issues as broadly conceived, the UNSC did not have adequate relationships with the international financial institutions (IFIs) through which to effectively steer the relevant political-financial linkages necessary for effective post-conflict recovery.
2. There was inadequate coordination among UN agencies and departments, in part because of lack of coherence among donors, whose separate strategies drive and enable separate agency action.
3. There was a lack of timely and adequate financing for the critical issue of the start-up or restoration of government institutions in post-conflict contexts, especially for the rule of law.
4. There was a lack of medium-term political attention to countries emerging from conflict.

Following endorsement by member states in the 2005 *World Summit Outcome Document*, the PBC was established as an intergovernmental advisory body by corresponding resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. These resolutions mandated the PBC to:

- a. Bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;
- b. Focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;
- c. Provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities, and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery.

How has the PBC performed?

We found positive signs and concrete examples to indicate that the PBC is beginning to find its niche and demonstrate its value-added, particularly on problems (1) and (4) identified above – creating linkages between political/security and financial/development actors, and maintaining long-term attention. In both Burundi and Sierra Leone, the existence of a body that connected the UN missions, a broad grouping of member states including key donors and troop contributors, the international financial institutions, and the national authorities, provided a tool through which to resolve critical challenges and help keep both countries on the path to sustainable peace. Performance on coordination issues has been more mixed, and on early financing, is as yet untested. Predictably for a new intergovernmental body, the PBC got off to a slow start. In its first year, the Commission was beset by procedural obstacles, resulting in delays, frustration, and confusion in the field and at headquarters. For the first nine months, procedure trumped performance. At the end of its first year, members and outside observers alike were expressing skepticism that the PBC could fulfil its mandate effectively or efficiently. However, since late summer 2007, the PBC has had a demonstrably positive impact in Burundi and Sierra Leone on events on the ground, the critical criterion for measurement. Indeed, that performance has been sufficient to demonstrate the merit and potential contribution of the PBC. An assessment of cautious optimism is widely shared among PBC members, alongside a recognition of the need to streamline still cumbersome procedures and resolve or surmount tensions about the relationship between the PBC and the principal UN organs. Members are also cognizant of a need to work to reverse early negative impressions formed in capitals and among UN departments and agencies during the procedure-heavy first phase of the PBC's life. A more detailed review of PBC performance can be broken down against the problems it was proposed to solve, and its mandated tasks.

Strategy and the linkage between political and financial aspects

A central purpose behind the founding of the PBC was to develop better linkages between political and financial aspects of post-conflict recovery – or to build security-

development links, to use terminology more familiar at the UN. In the PBC's first two cases, Burundi and Sierra Leone, the principal means by which it strove to fulfill this function was through the articulation of integrated peacebuilding strategies. Early discussions about the merits of such an approach were drawn out, and the process for elaborating the strategies laborious – an issue addressed further below. The approach to developing a strategic framework was different in each case and the experience mixed. However, through the dialogue it fostered among the relevant stakeholders, the PBC has demonstrated its value as a platform for addressing the important linkages between the political/security and economic/financial aspects of peace consolidation. Moreover, the process – and the simple fact of the relevant actors participating together in the process and in the body – created opportunities to resolve tensions between the financial and political aspects of peacebuilding in each country, or to build synergies between them. Two episodes had particular impact on members' attitudes, and highlight the unique advantages of the PBC in bringing the key actors together at headquarters.

The first of these was the PBC's response when the IMF signaled its intent to delay completion of its Sixth Review in Burundi. In-country actors including senior personnel of the UN mission saw this as potentially destabilising to the country and the peace process. The potential crisis was defused in substantial part through active work by the PBC – especially the Chair of the Burundi Country-Specific Meeting – to create political space for dialogue between the government and the IMF, signaling the strong imperative for the government to resolve key governance issues and for economic actors to consider the impact an economic crisis would have on the political and security situation. That work took place both at headquarters and in the field, and directly linked political decision-making at headquarters to field realities. In Sierra Leone, similarly, the recent incorporation of energy as a priority in the strategic framework highlights an important principle: specifically, that economic risk can be as significant a threat to peace as security or political risks. In this case the PBC fostered negotiation among the relevant stakeholders to garner political support for the inclusion of energy – normally considered a medium-to-long-term development concern – in a framework for peace consolidation. Both cases reinforce the essential point that political and financial aspects of recovery need to reinforce each other. Institutionally, this means that the UN and the IFIs must work together to drive coherent strategy for recovery, and the PBC is contributing to that objective.

- To consolidate the PBC's critical function in establishing these linkages, the modalities for interaction with the World Bank and the IMF need to be streamlined, partly in the field in the interaction with E/SRSGs, but also at the policy level. Informal dialogue between the PBC's Organisational Committee and the IFIs could help ensure that each body is adequately informed of the others' policies and functions. This would require a willingness on the part of the PBC to invite the IFIs to have sustained and substantive participation in the Organisational Committee.

Sustained attention

The PBC's contributions in Burundi and Sierra Leone can also be attributed to the attention brought to bear by the PBC at a point well after that which would normally receive sustained focus from the UNSC. As noted by the High-level Panel, political attention to countries emerging from conflict tends to wane after the withdrawal of international peacekeeping forces but before national institutions are fully consolidated, amplifying risks of conflict relapse. While it is encouraging that the PBC has successfully maintained this kind of attention on Burundi and Sierra Leone for the past 18 months, it is critical that international attention not wane from these two countries as the PBC's work evolves. It is likely that the country-specific configurations need not meet as intensively as they did during the development of the strategic frameworks; but ensuring implementation of commitments made within those frameworks will require more than just episodic spot-checking. The Burundi and Sierra Leone Country-Specific Meetings will have to meet at regular intervals to monitor progress (see below), drive course correction, and sustain pressure on the international community and the government to live up to their commitments. The recent adoption of the monitoring mechanism in Burundi provides an important path forward in that case. It should be noted, however, that this is not the first time that the UN has adopted strategic monitoring mechanisms – it did so, for example, in Afghanistan in the late 1990s. It is, however, the first time a monitoring mechanism has been adopted that has the buy-in of the government, opposition and local civil society groups, the in-country donors, and the full membership of the PBC – a far more powerful tool. Effective use of the monitoring mechanism by the PBC as well as by the Secretary-General and his representatives to sustain pressure on the government, the political parties, the donors, regional actors, and others will be essential to the longer-term impact of the PBC's work.

It is also worth emphasising that the extent to which the window of opportunity offered by PBC attention can be leveraged to deliver peace dividends depends fundamentally on the will of national actors to take responsibility for peace consolidation in their country. No matter how much funding and strategic coordination is brought to bear by the international community, peacebuilding success hinges on national responsibility.

Coherence and UN coordination

The PBC's performance on coherence and UN coordination has been rather more mixed. The process of developing strategic frameworks has, over time, delivered some positive improvements on coherence – or the prospects for it – on the ground, but at substantial cost in time spent. That the process was cumbersome at headquarters is notable but less significant than the fact that it was cumbersome also for the national government and for the UN. Part of the challenge lies in the multiple centres of deliberation and decision-making involved in the PBC's work. Key stakeholders that are active at the country level, in New York, and from their own capitals have not always engaged with a coherent voice.

- The PBC will need to streamline its work, a task that is likely to be made easier by the experience gained and instruments developed over the past 18 months and with additional advance preparation from a now fully staffed Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).
- Critically, this must involve far fewer meetings of the country-specific mechanisms to allow for (a) more substantial preparation, and (b) more consistent, higher-level participation by PBC members.
- PBC members must recognize that their constructive engagement is crucial at all levels, which will demand greater coherence in each member's approach between field, capital, and New York representation.

In the cases of Burundi and Sierra Leone, the existence of an internationally agreed framework creates a powerful tool for coordination.

- It is now the job of the Secretary-General and his Special/Executive Representatives to drive coordination around the approved frameworks. The PBC should empower the PBSO to play that role vis-à-vis the UN system (see below).
- Financial contributors to Burundi and Sierra Leone will also have to ensure that their funding decisions reinforce the frameworks. The Secretary-General should use the PBSO's capacity for monitoring to track resource flows, and should not be shy to point out when donors are falling short of their commitments or undermining the agreed strategy – a task better done at headquarters than in the field, where E/SRSGs will have to tread more carefully in their relationships with key donors.

Notably, the establishment of the PBC and PBSO has not yet led to renewed efforts to ensure effective coordination within the UN against agreed strategy (see below).

Mobilising resources and early financing for (re)building institutions

As the PBC engages in a dialogue on strategic priorities with the countries on its agenda, it is also essential to examine how those priorities are currently resourced and whether there are any shortfalls. The recently approved Monitoring and Tracking Mechanism for Burundi is a good start, and one that will require active follow-up. However, without a realistic mapping of current resource flows and activities, it will be very difficult for the PBC to ensure that existing and new resources are channelled effectively to support the government's efforts to consolidate peace. To support its resource mobilisation mandate, the PBC needs a clear picture of assistance from the outset to determine whether and how support should be modified and new resources channelled.

- There is a potential role for the PBSO – working with the national government in each country, the World Bank, UNDP, DPKO, OCHA, and others – to provide the PBC an overall map of resource flows to the countries on the PBC's agenda, highlighting gaps and overlaps.

The PBF: In interviews with PBC members, we encountered two sets of views in relation to resource mobilisation and the role of the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) that are not just at odds with one another but also – as we see it – with the mandate of the PBC and the PBF. First, some members, mostly non-donors, believed that the PBF should operate more closely under the direction of the PBC. Second, others, mostly donors, viewed the PBF as the key resource mobilisation function of the PBC. In contrast to these views, we see, first, the importance of the Secretary-General retaining flexibility in the use of the PBF to meet critical needs that typically go unfulfilled in post-conflict contexts – speed and flexibility are of the essence, and so far not characteristics of the PBC. The PBF is intended to fund very urgent, targeted, and discrete interventions, some of which would otherwise go unfunded because they arise in areas that do not attract traditional development assistance; this was well illustrated by the use of the PBF to fund time-critical activities in the lead-up to the Sierra Leone elections.

- The small, targeted and short-term PBF funds should be reserved for immediate, critical priorities.
- It should also be stressed that the PBC's resource mobilisation mandate extends far beyond the PBF: it should harness existing international efforts and bring additional resources to bear over a sustained period of time with a specific focus on (re)building state institutions that will be able to sustain the hard-won gains of peace consolidation.

Related is the new focus by PBF donors on whether the Fund's expenditure is consistent with OECD/DAC criteria. While we understand donors' concerns in this regard, and take note of the PBSO's estimate that ca. 80% of PBF-funded activities would likely meet DAC criteria, we believe that donors should be cautious lest they hamstring the functioning of the PBF – which would obviate the point of its establishment. This of course is just one part of the wider problem of the mismatch between internationally available financing and actual post-conflict requirements.

Early financing: International resources need to be channelled into the business of building state institutions from the very earliest days of post-conflict engagement. It is impossible to assess the PBC's potential role in this area because the first countries on its agenda were well past the early phase of recovery. The PBF has been used to help on these issues in non-PBC cases, but the sums involved are minimal – essentially seed funding. As donors – notably the UK – begin to explore possible new modalities for early recovery financing, the issue of the connection to the PBF will be an important concern.

The PBC in context: relationship to other bodies

During the period in review, the question of the role of the Organisational Committee (OC) has been clouded by its use as a proxy in the ongoing battle over the balance of power between the Security Council and the General Assembly. This is an issue that has recently colored much UN debate, though, of late, temperatures have cooled somewhat.

In this regard, it is worth noting that the establishment of the PBC does not and cannot alter the responsibilities of Charter bodies. It is the responsibility of those bodies to make effective use of PBC advice – not the other way around.

On the other hand, one of the striking facts of the PBC's deliberations, both in the OC and the Country-Specific Meetings (CSMs), is that divisions over its role have cut across traditional 'north-south' divides (an increasingly archaic depiction of political divisions at the UN). Of particular note is the extent to which several African members of the PBC have articulated a conception of the PBC's role and agenda that is similar to that of several OECD countries. While the core business of the PBC is to support the achievement of results on the ground, many members do believe that the OC has an important role to play in resolving outstanding procedural issues, navigating the PBC's relationship with other UN organs, and addressing strategic issues that will arise across cases and will need to be resolved at a broad policy level.

- The PBC's Organisational Committee could usefully address strategic issues such as (a) improving the responsiveness of aid instruments to the special needs and capacities of post-conflict contexts, and (b) promoting coordinated support for peacebuilding in the countries on its agenda through PBC members' participation in other UN and multilateral bodies.
- To ensure that performance trumps procedure rather than the reverse, the PBC should retain flexibility in its relationship and communications with the Security Council, GA, and ECOSOC. The approach taken by the Burundi CSM of negotiating conclusions and recommendations following the Chair's mission in early September and sending the final document to all three organs was recognized by many members as a good model.

Looking forward

Selection of new cases

A common understanding is evolving regarding the PBC's potential contribution in countries in different phases of their transition. The selection of the next cases for the PBC's agenda will heavily shape the body's ability to consolidate its impact, streamline its procedures, and highlight its unique contribution. Going forward, the PBC should consider engaging in cases where the Security Council is beginning to contemplate a handover or draw-down. The PBC's early success in bringing security, political, and development considerations into a common framework would be a valuable asset in helping to plan for such transitions. By engaging in such cases, the PBC would leverage the expertise of troop contributors, regional actors, and other non-donors in the CSMs. It would also usefully clarify to countries considering seeking PBC support that placement on the PBC agenda does not necessarily mean removal from that of the Security Council – currently a point of some confusion internationally. Such cases need not necessarily involve full CSM processes of the type developed for Burundi and Sierra

Leone; far more streamlined processes would not only suffice, they would likely have more impact.

- The Commission should be flexible in its approach to new cases, while retaining the possibility of evolution in its engagement as a country's needs change. In addition to 'full' CSMs, along the lines of the Burundi and Sierra Leone configurations, the PBC could consider 'exploratory' or 'advance planning' working groups or similar, lighter alternative formats.
- Adoption of a 'tiered' or 'differentiated' agenda would be helpful for enhancing PBC effectiveness and efficiency, as well as for ensuring that the PBC can broaden its scope to engage new countries seeking attention and support – which is important for both equity and political reasons.

A debate that will soon confront the PBC is whether (or when) to take on 'large' cases. So far, the three cases on the PBC's agenda are small both in size of the country and in international financial commitments. PBC members have been understandably concerned to first demonstrate value-added in smaller cases before taking on larger challenges. However, critical needs are looming, and the PBC will soon have to confront a choice between keeping its case-load small but risking being seen as irrelevant in the face of peacebuilding reversals in larger, high-profile cases, or tackling those cases head on.

The role of the Secretary-General and the PBSO

During its first year of operation, there was a sense among PBC members of a lack of direction from the PBSO – a view we see as uncharitable, given that the PBSO was barely staffed during much of the year, having neither budgets nor promised secondments. With the approval of the interim budget, and with decisions of the SG's Policy Committee establishing a central strategy role for the PBSO, the Office now has the requisite tools to perform its intended functions. Even without adequate staffing, the PBSO did provide important and substantive backstopping to the chairs of the country-specific mechanisms, a function greatly appreciated by those chairs. Interviews with other UN stakeholders make clear what PBSO will itself acknowledge, that it has not yet established a clear pattern of working with DPKO, UNDP, the World Bank, and other critical actors in helping to shape strategy, or in monitoring implementation. This is in part a function of other departments' understandable confusion over the PBSO's role, a confusion exacerbated by the fact of timing (i.e. the establishment of the PBSO just prior to a transition between Secretary-Generals). In this regard, the World Bank's recognition of the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy process as a framework within which it can develop its post-conflict needs assessment and plans is an important step forward that should be actively consolidated. Lack of progress on coordination issues is also a function of limited engagement to date by the Secretary-General. The PBC and the PBSO are instruments that the SG can use to drive coherent strategy across the Organization. To date, however, there has been little involvement by the SG, a fact

widely noted by members. In the period ahead, certainly, the SG can do more to ensure that the strategies emerging from the PBC, rooted as they are in intergovernmental decision, are taken fully into account by all parts of the UN system. Although there are important constraints on the PBSO in the form of some members' views that it should focus on providing secretariat support to the PBC itself, we nevertheless see scope for the PBSO to be used more energetically by the Secretary-General to help drive strategic coordination. This might most effectively be achieved through greater interaction between the PBSO and the Policy Committee on overall strategy, as well as through substantive engagement between the PBSO and expanded regional departments of DPA, if those are authorized by the membership.

- PBSO should leverage its unique position – inside the SG's office, with available links to the Policy Committee, and attached to a member state body with broad composition – to develop its capacities to (a) encourage coherent strategy, and (b) monitor the implementation of PBC-agreed strategy and overall resource flows. This will require clearer understanding among the relevant parties that the PBSO's functionality lies in its ability to bring together all parts of the system and a recognition from the PBSO that this involves building on existing capacities.

Other gaps: rapid civilian response

In undertaking the problem assessment that led to the proposals for the PBC, hindsight suggests that the High-level Panel underestimated a critical factor: the lack of ready deployable civilians in such critical functions as strategic planning, advisory support in the rule of law for early peacebuilding response. This is an area requiring new efforts. The creation of the Rule of Law and Police Institutions pillar at DPKO and the establishment of a 'surge' capacity in UNDP/BCPR are both steps in the right direction, but further efforts will be required to ensure that the UN can rely on an early, predictable supply of high-quality and appropriate talent from north and south to fulfill vital civilian peacebuilding tasks in the earliest phases of engagement. The Government of Denmark has commissioned CIC to undertake a detailed background study on rapid deployment of civilians and to develop an action plan for addressing the problem. Other governments have highlighted the problem as well; most recently, the UK government called for a stand-by reserve of civilians.

Conclusion

The PBC is a work in progress, but one that so far has proved the potential for its contribution. Continued focus on its performance by all stakeholders will be necessary if it is to (a) consolidate its positive impact on cases undertaken to date, and (b) extend its reach to new cases. In selecting new cases, the PBC should be cognizant of its potential to solidify its role as the central international meeting ground of political/security and financial/development actors. More broadly, three things will be critical in the coming 18 months to consolidate the PBC's turn-around and enhance its impact: the

election of strong, dedicated chairs; commitment by PBC members to fulfill commitments made in Burundi and Sierra Leone, and soon in Guinea-Bissau; and commitment from the SG (with the PBSO) to drive coordinated implementation of the strategies adopted by the PBC.

Notes

- 1 Transcript of press conference by Kofi Annan, UN, New York, 8 September 2003, <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2003/sgsm8855.html>
- 2 See <http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/305/PBCsrev08.pdf>
- 3 UN General Assembly, Triennial Comprehensive Review of Operational Activities of the United Nations Development System: Conclusions and Recommendations, Report of the Secretary General, Document A/62/253, p. 4, August 2007.
- 4 *Taking Stock, Looking Forward: A Strategic Review of the Peacebuilding Commission*, NYU-Center on International Cooperation and the International Peace Institute, April 2008, www.cic.nyu.edu/peacebuilding/docs/takingstocklookingforward.pdf

Annex 2.3
Current Official Development Assistance and Future Projections

	2006			2010		
	Net ODA (2006 US\$ m)	ODA/GNI (%)	Assumptions	Net ODA (2006 US\$ m)	ODA/GNI (%)	Real change in ODA compared with 2006 2006 US\$ m (%)
Austria	1498	0.47	0.51% in 2010	1796	0.51	297 20
Belgium	1978	0.50	0.7% in 2010	3025	0.70	1047 53
Denmark	2236	0.80	Minimum 0.8%	2423	0.80	187 8
Finland	834	0.40	0.51% in 2010	1183	0.51	348 42
France ^a	10601	0.47	0.42% in 2007 and 0.7% in 2015	12519	0.51	1919 18
Germany	10435	0.36	0.51% in 2010	16355	0.51	5920 57
Greece	424	0.17	0.51% in 2010	1402	0.51	978 231
Ireland	1022	0.54	0.6% in 2010 and 0.7% in 2012	1294	0.60	273 27
Italy	3641	0.20	0.51% in 2010	10163	0.51	6522 179
Luxembourg	291	0.89	1% in 2009	376	1.00	85 29
Netherlands	5452	0.81	Minimum 0.8%	5962	0.80	510 9
Portugal	396	0.21	0.51% in 2010	1031	0.51	635 160
Spain ^{a,b}	3814	0.32	0.5% in 2008 and 0.7% in 2012	7920	0.59	4107 108
Sweden	3955	1.02	1%	4331	1.00	376 10
United Kingdom ^{a,b}	12459	0.51	0.37% in 2007–08, 0.56% in 2010 and 0.7% in 2013	14856	0.56	2397 19
DAC EU members, total	59035	0.43		84636	0.57	25600 43
Australia ^c	2123	0.30	See note c	2913	0.36	790 37
Canada ^d	3684	0.29	See note d	4162	0.30	478 13
Japan ^e	11187	0.25	See note e	10092	0.21	-1095 -10
New Zealand ^f	6 259	0.27	See note f	344	0.33	85 33
Norway	2954	0.89	1% over 2006–09	3661	1.00	707 24

Current Official Development Assistance and Future Projections (continued)

	2006		Assumptions	2010		
	Net ODA (2006 US\$ m)	ODA/GNI (%)		Net ODA (2006 US\$ m)	ODA/GNI (%)	Real change in ODA compared with 2006 2006 US\$ m (%)
Switzerland ^b	1646	0.39	See note g	1828	181	11
USA ^h	23532	0.18	See note h	24705	1173	5
DAC members, total	104421	0.31		132341	27920	27

^aODA/GNI ratios interpolated between 2007 and/or 2008 and the year to be attained.

^bSpain is aiming for a minimum of 0.5 per cent by 2008, with the intention then to aim for 0.7 per cent by 2012; the UK has announced a target of 0.56 per cent by 2010 and 0.7 per cent by 2013.

^cAustralia expects to continue increasing its ODA. Funding has been set aside in Australia's budget to allow it to increase its ODA to about Aus\$4.3 billion by 2010–11, equivalent to 0.3 per cent ODA/GNI. Australia intends to reach an ODA/GNI target of 0.5 per cent by 2015–16. The figure here is discounted by 2.5 per cent per annum for inflation.

^dCanada intends to double its 2001 International Assistance Envelope level by 2010 in nominal terms. The Canadian authorities estimate ODA will be Can\$5.1 billion in 2010. The ODA figure shown here is adjusted for 2 per cent annual inflation and converted to US dollars at the 2006 exchange rate.

^eJapan intends to increase its ODA by US\$10 billion in aggregate over the five years 2005–09 compared to 2004. The Secretariat's estimate assumes US\$1.17 billion extra in 2010, compared to 2004, no adjustment being made for inflation.

^fNew Zealand has announced commitments of 0.30 per cent in 2007–08 and 2008–09, 0.32 per cent in 2009–10 and 0.35 per cent in 2010–11 on a fiscal year basis. This is translated into a commitment of 0.33 per cent in 2010 on a calendar year basis.

^gThe current financial projections assume that 0.4 per cent will be reached by 2010.

^hThe USA does not issue or approve forecasts on projected ODA. The amount shown here is purely a Commonwealth Secretariat estimate. It is based on 2004 ODA plus US\$5 billion nominal per annum to cover the Gleneagles G8 commitments on increased aid to Africa, Millennium Challenge Account and initiatives on HIV/AIDS, malaria and humanitarian aid.

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