

Annex 6

WTO Proposals Relating to Special and Differential Treatment in Trade in Services

1. On 14 February 2003, the African Group in the WTO submitted a Joint Communication on SDT to the Committee on Trade and Development. With respect to trade in services, the Group recommended that:
 - The Committee on Trade and Development should set periodic benchmarks for the provision of financial and technical co-operation and other forms of SDT;
 - The developed countries should reserve quotas for the supply of services by developing country suppliers;
 - Developed countries should not adopt Mode 4 horizontal limitations, and should phase out existing limitations within two years;
 - Developed countries should report twice a year to the Council on Trade in Services on how they are implementing the targets set by the Committee on Trade and Development with respect to GATS Article IV;
 - Commitments under the GATS should reflect a proportion of at least 40:60 in short-term actual gains for developing and developed countries respectively;
 - The references to ‘flexibility’ and ‘more favourable treatment’ with respect to RTAs among developing countries should be taken to mean that the agreements are not required to comply with GATS Article V as long as they are entered into as part of wider economic liberalisation or regional integration programmes.¹⁰²

2. On 7 May 2003, the LDC Group submitted a Communication to the Council on Trade in Services relating to draft modalities for the treatment of LDCs in the services negotiations.¹⁰³ Its recommendations included the following:
 - LDCs to retain maximum flexibility in undertaking commitments,¹⁰⁴ not to be required to offer national treatment, and not to be required to undertake regulatory reform beyond their capacities;
 - Members to grant full market access and national treatment to LDCs in the sectors and modes of supply of export of interest to them;
 - Members to assist LDCs in obtaining training and transfer of technology;

- Members to facilitate the improvement of access to services and service suppliers of LDCs to distribution channels and information networks, especially in tourism, transport, audiovisual, and construction services;
- Members to undertake commitments to provide access to all categories of natural persons from LDCs, particularly semi-skilled and unskilled persons, without economic needs tests;
- LDCs to be granted maximum credit for their autonomous liberalisation measures without scheduling them as binding commitments;
- LDCs to be provided with targeted and co-ordinated technical assistance designed to strengthen their services capacity and its efficiency and competitiveness, as well as building human capacity and assisting regulatory reform.

Notes

- 1 However, there is a school of thought that holds that SDT provisions that allow developing countries to provide greater protection to their domestic industries than developed countries simply perpetuate the economic gap between the developed and the developing world by allowing the latter to refrain from taking measures of trade liberalisation and economic adjustment that would stimulate their economies to higher growth levels. Gibbs (1998) has observed that the 'earlier paradigm [favouring SDT] did not enjoy a consensus even among developing countries; it was viewed as ideological baggage from the past by some, or as a crutch which developing countries no longer needed and which was actually hindering their development'. See also Whalley (1999); Michaelopolis (2000). This paper is not the place for an in-depth analysis of this issue, but we discuss it briefly in the context of the pros and cons of SDT in section 2.8.
- 2 The term 'special and differential' does not appear anywhere in the GATS, although it does appear in a number of other WTO agreements. See, for example, Article 10 of the SPS Agreement, Part III of the Customs Valuation Agreement and Article 27 of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement.
- 3 For example, under the Agreement on Agriculture developing countries were subject to lower reduction commitments than developed countries with respect to tariffs and domestic subsidies, and were given more time to implement them. LDCs were completely exempt from the reduction commitments. To take another example, developing countries and LDCs were given longer periods of time to implement the TRIPS (Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement.
- 4 Matrices summarising the SDT provisions in these RTAs are provided in Annex 1 (North–South RTAs) and Annex 2 (South–South RTAs).
- 5 There are relatively few restrictions on Mode 2 supply, particularly on the part of the developed countries, with respect to the majority of service sectors and sub-sectors. Small and low-income countries are unlikely to have service industries that are large enough or competitive enough to consider investment (Mode 3 supply) in foreign countries (Hoekman, 2009).
- 6 The GATS, of course, contains no disciplines on the use of subsidies or safeguards. Articles X and XV call for future negotiations on these subjects, but they have made little or no progress in the DDA. Few RTAs contain effective safeguards provisions. Article 47 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (2001) (CARICOM) contains a general safeguard-type provision applicable to all obligations under the Treaty, including, presumably, services commitments. So far as we are aware, it has never been invoked, at least with regard to services. As discussed in section 2.8, note 49, some of the ASEAN FTAs contain safeguard provisions requiring consultations, but they do not permit unilateral action by the importing country. We are aware of no RTAs that impose substantive disciplines on subsidies on services.
- 7 Cited in Adhikari (2005).
- 8 Rubens Ricupero, former UNCTAD Secretary-General, has commented on this aspect of SDT, stating: 'The transitional periods for developing countries to implement the agreements have proved to be insufficient in light of the inadequacy of their administrative resources and access to financing. I have pointed out in several statements that the major developed countries have enjoyed 'transitional periods' approaching half a century to implement their GATT obligations. ...' (Ricupero, 2001: 51).
- 9 Services can be traded in four ways: Mode 1, Cross-border, when services are traded electronically or in some other way where the supplier and the consumer are in different countries; Mode 2, Consumption Abroad, where the consumer travels to another country to receive the service (e.g. tourism); Mode 3, Commercial Presence, i.e. a company establishes a presence in another country; and Mode 4, Temporary Movement of Natural Persons, where an individual travels to another country to provide a service.
- 10 In the Uruguay Round, Tanzania made only one commitment, covering hotels with four stars and above in the Travel and Tourism sector. See 'Tanzania – Draft Converted Schedule of Specific Commitments', S/DCS/W/TZA, 24 January 2003.
- 11 Relevant portions are reproduced in Annex 3.

- 12 The use of the term ‘parties to’ implies that developing countries are to be given more flexibility even where one or more developed countries are party to the agreement. This is in contrast to the case of RTAs covering trade in goods, where the relaxation of the strict requirements of GATT Article XXIV, including the coverage of ‘substantially all the trade’, only applies to RTAs ‘amongst developing countries’. See ‘Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries’, Decision of 28 November 1979 (L/4903) (the Enabling Clause), para. 2(c).
- 13 The EU has taken the position that Article V requires 80 per cent of total service trade between the parties to a free trade agreement to be covered in order to conform to Article V, but that the flexibility provision in paragraph 3 (a) means that the coverage does not have to be symmetrical. Thus, the EU believes that the CARIFORUM EPA is consistent with Article V because it covers 80 per cent of total trade between the parties, comprised of commitments with respect to 94 per cent of trade in the case of the EU itself, 65 per cent in the case of the developing CARIFORUM parties (90 per cent in the case of the Dominican Republic), and 55 per cent in the case of the LDC party, Haiti (Sauvé and Ward, 2009; Kelsey, 2010). According to Sauvé and Ward (2009), it is not clear whether the percentages refer to volume of trade or the central product classification, or a combination of both.
- 14 Relevant portions of these documents are reproduced in Annex 4.
- 15 ‘Elements Required to Complete the Services Negotiations’, appended to the Services Group Chairman’s Report of 28 July 2008 (T/N/S/34).
- 16 It has been suggested that use of pre-commitments, i.e. undertakings to liberalise a particular sector or mode at some point in the future, is a form of SDT, and most of the pre-commitments in the GATS schedules were in fact made by developing countries (OECD, 2006).
- 17 Statistics on trade in services are intrinsically unreliable, and in any event are not correlated with the WTO’s sector and sub-sector classifications (Kelsey, 2010).
- 18 The LDCs made commitments in an average of 24 sub-sectors, the developing countries in 41 and the developed countries 105. The average for all members was 50.
- 19 WTO (2009b).
- 20 WTO (2009a).
- 21 Even to analyse the offers that are publicly available would require a sector-by-sector comparison of each country’s existing schedule and its offer to determine what new had been placed on the table. In any event, only nine developed country and seven developing country offers (out of 71 initial offers and 31 revised offers that have been submitted) have been made public (see WTO website), so that any analysis would not be representative. It may be worth noting that a World Bank study has concluded that the offers made by the OECD countries, while an improvement over the existing GATS schedules, are still not as liberal as their applied policies (Gootiz and Mattoo, 2009).
- 22 The following summary of the Doha Round offers on Mode 4 is drawn from information in a study by the UNCTAD Secretariat (2003).
- 23 Parties to a negative list services agreement typically schedule not only existing non-conforming measures, but also possible future non-conforming measures, to provide themselves with some policy space. We have not included these in our analysis.
- 24 For example, one non-conforming measure scheduled by the USA in Annex I of all of the RTAs it has negotiated since NAFTA covers both cross-border trade in services and investment, and exempts all the measures taken at the level of states and local governments from any of the disciplines of the agreement, including MFN treatment, national treatment, no local presence requirement and other obligations.
- 25 We have not included Mode 1 commitments that are conditional on commercial presence, since these are meaningless for many developing countries, particularly smaller ones, which generally do not have service suppliers with the capacity to invest in foreign markets (Hoekman, 2009).
- 26 The original agreement did not contain a schedule of non-conforming measures for Brunei Darussalam because it was given two years to comply with the services portion of the Agreement. While Brunei Darussalam may have subsequently prepared a schedule, we have been unable to find it.
- 27 The discussion in this section draws on the studies by Stephenson and Delourme (2010) and by Stephenson and Hufbauer (2010).
- 28 The story of labour mobility within trade agreements is still being written. Currently several RTAs are under negotiation between developed economies and developing ones. The EU is negotiating

with the four members of MERCOSUR, India, ASEAN and South Korea. Canada is negotiating with CARICOM, four countries in Central America, the Dominican Republic, Jordan, Panama, Singapore and South Korea. Japan is negotiating with India and Peru. Australia is negotiating with China, the Gulf Cooperation Council, South Korea, and Malaysia. The USA is negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership with a number of Pacific Rim countries. Thus the sample for evaluating the treatment of labour mobility in RTAs will continue to expand in the coming years. Developing countries that are able to pro-actively define and push their interests with developed country trading partners should find opportunities that did not exist in the past.

29 Technical assistance is also called for by Paragraph 6 of the Annex on Telecommunications (reproduced in Annex 3), which provides in part that:

(c) In cooperation with relevant international organizations, Members shall make available, where practicable, to developing countries information with respect to telecommunications services and developments in telecommunications and information technology to assist in strengthening their domestic telecommunications services sector.

(d) Members shall give special consideration to opportunities for the least-developed countries to encourage foreign suppliers of telecommunications services to assist in the transfer of technology, training and other activities that support the development of their telecommunications infrastructure and expansion of their telecommunications services trade.

As with Article XXV.2, there is no binding commitment as to the amount or timing of technical assistance.

30 See <http://tcdbd.wto.org>, which shows that the value of technical assistance with respect to trade in services between 2001 and 2007 (part-year) was as follows: US\$4.7m (2001); US\$17.9m (2002); US\$5.5m (2003); US\$4.4m (2004); US\$5.3m (2005); US\$3.5m (2006); US\$0.7m (2007). Te Velde (2005) provides details of the services-related technical assistance provided by the WTO and other international organisations.

31 See TN/S/34 (28 July 2008).

32 See, for example: (1) Grenada (exclusive supply until 2006, no restrictions thereafter); Tunisia (no restrictions on local calls after 2003).

33 Additionally, many of the offers submitted, particularly those by developing countries, have not been made public, so it would be impossible to examine them.

34 The additional time was calculated differently for each country. In the case of Brunei Darussalam, the obligations applied from a date certain, 1 January 2009. Cambodia's obligations were to apply three years after entry into force of the agreement. Laos was to apply its commitments at the earliest of (a) its accession to the WTO, and (b) the entry into force of domestic legislation implementing the obligations. Thailand was to implement its obligations after the expiration of its last concession contract. The date for Vietnam to assume its obligations was to be three years after they were reflected in domestic laws and regulations.

35 Defined as LDCs and member states that may require special support measures on a temporary basis.

36 As of October 2009, 83 WTO members had established contact points. See *Contact and Enquiry Points Notified to the Council for Trade in Services*, S/ENQ/78/Rev.11, 26 October 2009. GATS Article IV.2 specifies that service suppliers who need technical assistance are to be given access to the services of these contact points.

37 See Section 2.7.2 below.

38 As noted in the Introduction to this paper, there is a view that the provision of SDT has not benefited the developing countries.

39 Of course many countries, including developing countries, have unilaterally opened their service markets considerably more than required by their WTO commitments.

40 It has been estimated that a 10 per cent decrease in the cost of transport increases trade by 25 per cent (Hodge, 2002).

41 See, for example, Robinson, Wang and Martin (1999); Mattoo, Rathindran, and Subramanian (2001); Hoekman (2009). Hoekman (2006) summarises many of these studies. See also the studies referred to in Chapter 5 of this paper.

42 A study underlining the benefits of services liberalisation in general and in five different sectors

(financial services, business services, express delivery, audiovisual and telecommunication services) includes many examples of developing countries. See Coalition of Service Industries (2006). Various chapters in the recent volume published by the World Bank and edited by Cattaneo, Engman, Saez and Stern (2010), contain discussion and examples of various developing countries who have reaped benefits from services liberalisation in non-backbone service sectors, namely: health services, distribution services, construction services, information technology services, accounting services and engineering services. A discussion of the estimated quantitative benefits from services liberalisation is contained in Chapter 5 of this study.

- 43 Service suppliers in the poorer countries are of course better equipped to compete under Mode 1, which simply requires access to the internet, than Mode 4. Nevertheless, as discussed in the next section, they face significant obstacles with respect to this mode also.
- 44 Manduna (2005). The majority of LDCs that were members of the WTO made commitments in fewer than 20 sub-sectors.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 According to Manduna (2005), it has been suggested that some South African service providers are not globally competitive, even though they may be the most efficient in the region. As a result of their proximity, as well as South Africa's close economic ties with Lesotho, they were often the 'first movers' in the Lesotho market. Other potential investors are inhibited by the small size of the market, so that Lesotho is locked in with service providers who may not be the most competitive. However, the key question is not whether Lesotho could have more competitive service providers, but whether the presence of South African firms has produced more welfare benefits than would exist without them.
- 47 In a study of 81 developing countries, Fink, Mattoo and Rathindran (2002) showed that there was a substantial increase in productivity and efficiency in countries that privatised incumbent telecommunications operators, added competitors and established independent regulators.
- 48 Zambia's experience illustrates the dangers of opening service markets without having the necessary regulatory structures in place. At the time of liberalisation of the banking sector, the absence of minimum prudential rules, such as proper loan classification and internal controls, led to a rapid growth of financial institutions. This created a credit boom which was followed by a series of bank failures. In the case of telecommunications, the government did open the mobile sector, which now has two independent providers, but the government-owned fixed line operator was left with a *de facto* monopoly. The mobile operators are charged an interconnection fee for outgoing international calls equal to 80 per cent of the fixed line operator's retail price. As a result, the price of international calls is much higher than the regional and global average (Mattoo and Payton, 2007). In some sectors, such as non-life insurance, liberalisation did result in lower prices. For example, motor vehicle premiums fell from between 10 and 16 per cent of the value of the car in 1992 to 6 per cent 15 years later (ibid.).
- 49 Only one of the RTAs we examined, the CARICOM Agreement, contains a safeguard-type clause which allows the importing party to impose restrictions unilaterally. See Chapter 1 of this paper. Several of the ASEAN FTAs contain safeguard provisions specifically relating to services, but these merely require consultations between the parties and measures can only be imposed by agreement among the parties. See, for example, ASEAN/Australia–New Zealand FTA, Article 19; ASEAN–China FTA, Article 17; ASEAN–Korea FTA, Article 18. However, it is significant that the agreements at least recognize the concept of and need for safeguards.
- 50 Mode 2 access is generally not restricted.
- 51 In practice, of course, few countries impose restrictions on Mode 1 supply, even if they have not formally opened it in the GATS or in an RTA.
- 52 Merely determining what regulatory barriers exist can be expensive and time-consuming. As noted above, potential service exporters can gain a good deal of useful information in this respect during the negotiation of an FTA.
- 53 Small service exporters in the Caribbean have reported that lack of international credibility is their greatest barrier to growth (Riddle, 2002b).
- 54 Even in developed countries small businesses are often charged higher interest rates than larger firms (Riddle, 2002b).
- 55 Proposals relating to SDT submitted to the WTO by the African Group and the LDC Group are reproduced in Annex 6.

- 56 Hoekman (2000) suggests that members to trade agreements should pursue the request for one-to-one mappings between commitments relating to Modes 1 and 3 in order to ensure non-discrimination across modes. This modal neutrality is an objective worth pursuing because, as is often emphasised in the literature, trade and investment have increasingly become complementary.
- 57 See Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(05)/DEC, adopted 22 December 2005), Annex C, para. 1.
- 58 See, for example, Mattoo (2002). A few years ago there was considerable concern in the USA about the loss of jobs to outsourcing of back-office functions to developing countries, and several states considered passing legislation to prevent outsourcing overseas. Nothing came of this at the time, but it is an issue that could surface again in the future. Binding by the USA of Mode 1 commitments without Mode 3 linkage (currently most Mode 1 commitments made by the USA are linked to Mode 3 (Cho, 2009)) would prevent this.
- 59 Walmsley and Winters (2005) have estimated that the opening of the developed countries to allow temporary entry equal to 3 per cent of their workforce would produce welfare gains greater than those resulting from full merchandise trade liberalisation. Rodrik (2002) has calculated that the same degree of Mode 4 opening would result in a gain of US\$200 billion.
- 60 For example, one of the authors learned that Tuvalu, a country of some 10,000 people, has around 900 qualified seamen, many of whom are currently unemployed.
- 61 See Faini (2007); Ozden and Schiff (2006). These authors investigate the link between migration and remittances and their results show that migrants tend to offset their absence by sending transfers back home.
- 62 The UNCTAD Secretariat, in its study 'Increasing the Participation of Developing Countries through liberalisation of Market Access in GATS Mode 4 for Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services', estimates that even limited liberalisation of Mode 4 would provide gains to developing countries and to the world 25 times larger than those that could be obtained from liberalisation in traditional areas of trade in goods and agriculture. See UNCTAD, TD/B/COM.1/EM.22/2 of 18 June 2003.
- 63 See UNCTAD Secretariat (2003).
- 64 Commercially meaningful market access for developing countries providers of services through Mode 4 would include such services activities as tourism, construction, maintenance work and cleaning services for lower-skilled workers and several categories for skilled workers. Commitments in these sectors would reflect a development-oriented negotiated outcome.
- 65 See Stephenson and Hufbauer (2010).
- 66 See, for example, NAFTA and the EC–Mexico and EC–Chile FTAs, available at worldtradelaw.net
- 67 Enquiry points were to be established to provide information to other members, and contact points to provide information to developing countries' service suppliers. In most, if not all, cases the enquiry and contact points are the same. See International Trade Centre (2000), Appendix VII.
- 68 Such trade capacity issues include rural diversification programmes for agricultural products (e.g. coffee), strengthening of food and agriculture regulatory systems, market linkages for goods and services, food industry development, sanitary and phyto-sanitary issues, and the strengthening of labour, judicial and customs systems.
- 69 Figure taken from the website of the United States Trade Representative at www.ustr.gov
- 70 From *Development and Democracy*, Report of the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, 2003, p. 17.
- 71 See website of the Commonwealth Secretariat for detailed information on the 'Hub and Spokes' programme: http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/191502/159353/what_is_hub_spokes/
- 72 From 'Hub and Spokes Project: Mid-Term Review', 2004/2009, carried out by Freer Spreckley in September 2007. Other review reports can be found at: Pacific Brief: www.thecommonwealth.org/files/222002/FileName/HS_II_Regional_Brief_Pacific.pdf; Caribbean Brief: www.thecommonwealth.org/files/223379/FileName/RegionalBrief-Caribbean-Online.pdf; African Brief: www.thecommonwealth.org/files/223378/FileName/RegionalBrief-Africa-Online.pdf; Final Report: www.thecommonwealth.org/files/216008/FileName/FINALDRAFTPCCProgressReportJan-June20091.pdf
- 73 For example, several low-income developing countries in Africa undertook highly liberalised commitments in financial services under Protocol V of the GATS without fully realising the need to have

- appropriate regulatory and prudential requirements in place. This has resulted very negative consequences in some cases, with loss of income for consumers and the country as a whole. See, for example, the description of the experience of Zambia in financial services in Mattoo and Payton (2007), discussed in note 48 above.
- 74 Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579 (emphasis supplied).
- 75 Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation, Draft Consolidated Negotiating Text, TN/TF/W/165/Rev.9, 17 June, 2011. See also, Section II, Paras. 2.3, 5.3, 9.1, 9.2.
- 76 See Chandra (2006), 'Inter-Modal Linkages in Services Trade', OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 30, number JT00200273.
- 77 The authors are very grateful to Julian Arkell for his very detailed and insightful comments on this section of the study. Nearly all of his textual suggestions have been incorporated into this discussion.
- 78 Collection of FDI flows for the members of the OECD is a fairly recent activity and is undertaken through the gathering of FATS statistics, or 'foreign affiliates trade in services'.
- 79 See the useful survey of recent modelling efforts for services liberalisation carried out by Fukui and McDaniel (2010). This section summarises their discussion on the various channels through which liberalisation of services can affect the domestic economy. Another very useful article discussing how economists have gone about quantifying the impacts of trade liberalisation in services, specifically with reference to developing countries, is Whalley (2004).
- 80 This is the idea behind the computable general equilibrium models, which try to capture the 'network effects' of improved efficiency through services liberalisation on the entire economy.
- 81 A survey article by Hoekman (2000) discusses the earlier attempts to estimate the impact of services liberalisation, while the studies done during the past decade are surveyed by Fukui and McDaniel (2010).
- 82 Hoekman (2000) and Fukai and McDaniel (2010) survey a number of such studies. For example, Robinson, Wang, and Martin (1999) and Chadha (1999) use 'guesstimates' of the relative restrictiveness of services policies as revealed by the comprehensiveness of GATS commitments as inputs into the CGE models. Chadha *et al.* (2000) do the same, as do Konan and Maskus (2002) and Jensen, Rutherford and Tarr (2008).
- 83 See Fukui and McDaniel (2010).
- 84 See Hoekman (2000).
- 85 See Dee and Hanslow (1999), who show that for economies such as China, Hong Kong and Indonesia the gains from services liberalisation are a multiple of the gains associated with goods liberalisation, while the converse is true for countries such as New Zealand, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, the EU and the USA. In fact, the EU and the USA would lose, resulting from a change in the pattern of FDI stocks held worldwide and an associated loss in the rents they generate.
- 86 Hoekman (2006) presents a detailed discussion of the frequency approach and the gravity approach to estimating the impact of services trade barriers and the difficulties involved in obtaining the appropriate information on restrictive measures affecting services trade in order to carry them out.
- 87 Of course, the higher the price wedge or tariff equivalent, the larger will be the welfare and income effects of the resulting estimates.
- 88 Deardorff and Stern (2004) also present a thorough survey of these issues.
- 89 Of course it would be preferable if the reference paper were adopted by the WTO as a whole and binding on all developed country members, but this seems unrealistic.
- 90 See, for example, Council for Trade in Services, Report of the Meeting Held on 18 March 2011 (TN/S/M/41).
- 91 The concern is that a multinational corporation might set up a local entity and use it as a 'mailbox' to take advantage of the preference. The EU has reportedly suggested that a firm have substantial business operations in the LDC to qualify for the preference.
- 92 WTO Director-General Lamy put forward this suggestion at an informal meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee on 30 May 2011. The suggestion was discussed at the TNC meeting on 9 June 9 2011 and is still under consideration. See Lamy's statement at: >http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news11_e/tnc_infstat_31may11_e.htm
- 93 As noted in section 2.4.3 of this paper, a few developed countries have begun to allow access to semi-skilled workers in the context of their RTAs.

- 94 A number of WTO members have reserved the right in their GATS schedules to operate minimum wage requirements. See Adlung (2009).
- 95 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, adopted 18 November 2001.
- 96 S/L/93, adopted 29 March 2001.
- 97 TN/S/6, adopted 6 March 2003.
- 98 TN/S/13, adopted 5 September 2003.
- 99 TN/S/16, adopted 1 August 2004.
- 100 WT/MIN(05)/DEC, adopted 22 December 2005.
- 101 TN/S/34, 28 July 2008
- 102 TN/CTD/W/28, 14 February 2003.
- 103 TN/S/W/13, 7 May 2003. This was a revision of an earlier draft circulated on 2 December 2002 as JOB(02)/05.
- 104 As noted above, the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration acknowledged that LDCs will not be expected to make any new commitments.

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